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ABSTRACT
Investigation of the Relationship between Firm-wise Financial 
Factors and Firm Performance in the Hospitality Industry
by
Zhenxing Mao
Dr. Zheng Gu, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Hotel Administration 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This study empirically investigates the relationship between firm-wise financial 
factors and firm performance in the hospitality industry from 2000 to 2004 using panel 
data regression. After a literature review of firm-wise financial factors and their impact 
on performance in the literature, unit-effect and time-effect linear models were proposed 
and examined in both the restaurant and hotel sectors with different firm performance 
measures used as the dependent variable (i.e.. Proxy Q, Sharpe ratio, and Treynor ratio). 
While some variables, especially liquidity and solvency, were found to have significant 
impacts on firm performance measured by Proxy Q and Sharpe ratio in both the 
restaurant and hotel sectors, no financial variable was found to have a significant 
relationship with the Treynor ratio in either sector. Implications of this study’s findings 
for both the restaurant and hotel sectors are discussed at the end.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The hospitality industry is one of the largest and fastest growing industries in the 
world (Walker, 2006). It mainly consists of businesses that offer food, beverages and 
accommodations to their guests. Under the umbrella of the services industry, hospitality 
businesses share certain common characteristics with other service sectors. Tangible 
products, such as homes and televisions, can be possessed by individuals whereas 
intangible hospitality produets such as, holiday memories and travel experiences, can 
only be enjoyed and remembered by guests. Further, production and consumption of 
hospitality products are often simultaneous and therefore, inseparable. For example, 
guests experience the service and atmosphere at a restaurant while at the same time, 
consuming the food and beverages provided by servers. On the other hand, hospitality 
firms often differ from other service establishments in that they largely serve to travelers 
who are away from their local residence, although restaurants arguably can provide 
services to both locals and tourists (Harrison & Enz, 2005). Another unique feature of the 
hospitality industry is the perishability of goods because some products, such as hotel 
rooms, usually can not be saved for future consumption.
Two major sectors of the hospitality industry are the focal points of this study: 
restaurants and hotels (including casino hotels). The restaurant sector includes 
commercial dining and drinking establishments, such as restaurants, bars, cafeterias, ice
1
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cream parlors, and cafes. According to a recent industry forecast report by the National 
Restaurant Association (NRA), there were approximately 900,000 restaurants in the 
United States (US) with estimated sales of $476 billion in 2005, which equaled 4 percent 
of the total US gross domestic products (GDP). In fact, restaurants have experienced 14 
consecutive years of real sales growth since 1992 when inflation was adjusted. The 
restaurant sector is the largest private-sector employer in the US. It employed about 12.2 
million US workers in 2005, which is a roughly 9 percent of the total US workforce 
(National Restaurant Association [NRA], 2005). Considering that 9 percent of the total 
US workforce generates only 4 percent of total US GDP, this sector is particularly labor 
intensive with revenue per full time employee (PTE) being well below other industry’s 
standard figures. On the other hand, the hotel sector in the US is a $113.7 billion business 
which employed 1.8 million workers with approximately 47,600 hotels and over 4.4 
million guestrooms as of 2004 (American Hotel & Lodging Association [AHLA], 2005). 
Hotels usually have a high seasonality effect either by day of the week or month of the 
year, along with high operating costs relative to their revenues.
Corporate finance, by nature, monitors and evaluates a company’s operation. 
Generally, only financial data can provide direct, comparable and objective 
measurements for firm performance. Hence, financial analysis offers a very important 
insight into a company’s overall performance. Financial management involves the 
process of three major decisions: asset investment; capital financing; and dividend policy, 
all of which have a significant impact on the performance of different departments in a 
firm (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2005).
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Given the significant role of the hospitality industry in the whole economy and the 
importance of financial management, there is a great need to advance the theory and 
practice in hospitality financial management. Hospitality financial management will 
affect not only a specific firm per se, but also the overall industry. For instance, most 
hotels weathered the double blows of the 9/11 tragedy and economic downturn during the 
second half of 2001. Nevertheless, many restaurant companies still maintained their 
sustainable growth and achieved good performance as a whole during that time span. For 
example, Starbucks realized the largest percentage gain in 2001 for its brand name within 
the top 100 global brands (Khermouch, 2001). The success of Starbucks was multi­
faceted, but at least two possible reasons for its success may be explained by its financial 
management. Starbucks started to expand operations outside of North America in 1998 
and geographic diversification helped to mitigate the economic volatility by having 
operations in different nations. In addition, Starbucks had virtually no long-term debt, 
which kept its financial costs to a minimum and therefore, made it better able to 
withstand an economic recession. Its expansions were mainly through franchise 
operations with smaller upfront fees and lower capital risks. Thus, quality financial 
management can assist the hospitality firms in making healthy economic progress.
Research Questions
The goal of a firm is to maximize its firm value (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2005). Thus two 
fimdamental questions for any corporate financial professional should be: Will financial 
management in a firm make a difference in its value; and if so, how? Having noticed that 
firm performance is also greatly affected by the general economy and financial
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
conditions, the research interest of this study has been delimited to how firm-wise 
financial features can influence firm performance in the hospitality industry. In other 
words, the purpose of this study is to investigate relationships between the hospitality 
firm’s common financial components and its performance. Identifying and imderstanding 
these factors can help hospitality organizations improve firm performance through 
control and management of certain aspects of firm financial factors. Thus, the goal of this 
study is to help advance the understanding of financial management in the hospitality 
industry.
Significance of the Study 
Hospitality financial research has started to grow since the early 1990s and a rich 
body of knowledge has been generated over the past decade regarding the question of 
how to enhance firm performance by examining various firm-wise financial factors. Tsai 
(2005) examined the impact of institutional ownership on firm performance as measured 
by Tobin’s Q for hospitality industry from 1999 to 2003. After controlling for the effects 
of size, capital structure, and fixed assets percentage, he concluded that firm performance 
was significantly related with institutional ownership in both the restaurant and casino 
sectors. However, there was no significant relationship between institutional ownership 
and firm performance in the hotel sector. Gu and Kim (2001) explored the impact of 
managerial stock holdings on the restaurant firm performance using the financial data for 
restaurants from 1995 and 1996, while controlling their size and price/earning (P/E) 
effects. The results indicated a significant and positive relationship between restaurant 
firm performance and managerial ownership. A recent study conducted by Phillips and
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Sipahioglu (2004) revealed no significant relationship between capital structures and firm 
performance using the data from 43 United Kingdom (UK) hotel companies. However, 
their study adopted accounting profitability as a measure for firm performance. Further, 
no other factors except the capital structure constructs were considered, which could lead 
to a serious problem of model underestimation. By analyzing the relationship between 
firm performance and dividend policy using hotel real estate investment trust (REIT) s 
and non-REITs firms, Mooradian and Yang (2001) found that hotel REIT firms 
outperformed their non-REIT counterparts from 1993 to 1999, using firm size, leverage, 
growth and profitability as controlling variables. Their finding was consistent with 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis that more dividend payout was preferred in 
order to meet market expectations.
These previous studies have attempted to investigate the relationships between firm 
performance and capital structure, dividend policy, managerial ownership, and 
institutional ownership, respectively. However, these studies lacked consideration of 
certain firm-specific financial features such as liquidity and asset utilization, resulting in 
potential model misspecifications.
Based on an extensive survey of major journals in the hospitality management field, 
no studies on relationship between firm performance and firm-wise financial factors have 
been conducted in a comprehensive or integrated way for any sectors of the hospitality 
industry. In an effort to correct this oversight, this study attempts to examine the impact 
of common firm-specific financial constructs on firm performance in the restaurant and 
hotel (including casino hotel) sectors from two perspectives: imit (firm) effects and time
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effects. In addition, different firm performance measures will be adopted in the study to 
better understand the impacts of firm-wise financial factors.
Contributions of the Study
The contributions of this study are three-fold. First, this study provides a 
comprehensive review and investigation of many firm-specific factors at the full 
complement that may affect firm performance and examine firm-wise financial factors in 
a simultaneous, integrated manner. A large number of previous studies generally 
investigate effects of only a specific factor, such as capital structure on stock 
performance. Thus, the results of those studies and the conclusions may differ due to 
model construction effects. The approach adopted here paints a more complete picture by 
evaluating more financial factors. The results of this study will be robust with an 
investigation of a wide range of theoretical factors. Hence, this study attempts to be 
theoretically rigorous, compared to prior studies.
Second, this study employs a regression analysis with panel data to mitigate the 
measurement problems for omitted or unobservable variables (Wooldridge, 2002). Using 
panel data (both cross-sectional and time-series in nature), this study will be able to 
empirically generate results more reliable and generalizeable than either cross-sectional 
or time series data alone. More observations than a single year cross section group are 
tested. Furthermore, this study considers differenees between firms (i.e., unit effects) and 
the changes over time (i.e., time effects) to examine the relationship between firm-wise 
financial factors and performance. These two perspectives will complement each other to
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provide meaningful results. Most of previous studies in panel data regression usually 
focus solely on the unit effects model, leaving time effects untouched.
Third, this study provides hospitality academicians and practitioners alike with a 
better understanding of the relationship between firm-wise financial factors and firm 
performance. As such may help hospitality firms to achieve better performance 
practically. The findings of this study may assist hospitality executives in adjusting their 
financial policies to enhance firm values. Many general finance articles use 
heterogeneous and diverse industry samples to investigate the relationship between stoek 
performance and its underlying causes. The results may differ across industries since 
industries are not identical. Thus, a close focus on only one industry/sector may provide 
better insight and overcome this possible industry effect. This study offers such a solution 
to the problem with a focus on the hospitality industry. Further, like the customer and 
employee, the investor is also an important constituent of the hospitality industry. Stock 
performance is of critical importance to investors’ vested interest in the hospitality firms, 
and therefore, affects their desire to invest in the industry. Thus, investors’ perceptions of 
the firm’s financial status may influence the firm’s market value and affect its stock 
price.
Delimitations and Limitations
This study is limited to publicly traded hospitality firms identified through their 
individual North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code numbers, 
which are listed in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stoek and 
Options Exchange (AMEX), and the National Association of Securities Dealers
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Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) in 2004. One limitation is the survival bias 
which is inherent in this practice. In the case of survival bias, the findings of a study tend 
to overestimate the relationship between firm performanee and firm-wise financial factors 
because only firms with complete financial data set over the five year period will be 
investigated. Those firms which plunged during the time period will not be included. 
There are also some eoncems with respect to financial constructs since different firms 
could follow different accounting procedures.
This study combines the hotel and casino hotel firms into the hotel sector due to the 
fact that there are limited observations in each category and they share certain 
commonalities, such as being capital intensive and labor intensive, to name only a few. 
Finally, although many other factors such as marketing strategy, human resource 
practices, service quality, corporate culture, and information technology adaptation will 
affect a firm’s performance, this study only focuses on a firm’s finaneial constructs and 
more specifically, firm-wise financial factors. In other words, this study views a firm’s 
financial features from a micro-perspective, which can be influenced by the firm’s 
management.
Definitions
Activity. A financial construct that measines the degree of a firm’s ability to generate 
revenues through various assets; also known as “asset utilization and management”. 
Appraisal Ratio. Also known as information ratio, defined as the mean of the portfolio’s 
excess rates of return on the portfolio over the market return against its corresponding 
standard deviation (Goodwin, 1998).
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Beta. A symbol representing the systematic risk of a firm’s stock, or the undiversifiable 
portion of the investment risk inherent in stock ownership.
Business Diversification. A firm’s strategy to extend the business to different industry 
sectors.
Dependent Variables. Variables that influence other variables.
Dividend Policy. A financial construct determining how to distribute firm earnings.
Unit Effects. Also called firm effects which state that there are significant differences 
among units (firms), such as company culture, locations, customer bases, management 
style.
Geographical Diversification. A firm’s strategy to extend business to foreign nations. 
Growth. A financial construct reflecting a firm’s future earnings ability.
Independent Variables. Variables that are influenced by other variables.
Institutional Investors. Entities or organizations with large amounts of capital to invest, 
including pension funds, mutual funds, investment companies, insurance companies, and 
endowment funds.
Liquidity. A financial construct indicating a firm’s capability of meeting its short-term 
obligations and the quickness and certainty of an asset to be converted into cash at its fair 
market value.
Jensen Ratio. A risk-adjusted index; represented by the intereept in the model that has the 
excess rates of return on the portfolio over the risk-free return regressed against the 
excess rates of return on the market over the risk-free return (Jensen, 1968).
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Managerial Ownership. The proportion of the outstanding shares held by the firm’s 
corporate officers, directors, or individuals actively involved in the corporate decision­
making.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). A method of estimating the parameters of a multiple 
linear regression model by minimizing the sum of squared residuals.
Panel Regression. Regression teehnique applied to data that is both cross-sectional and 
time series in nature.
Profitability. A financial construct indicating how well the management makes 
investment and finaneial decisions to generate profits.
Proxy Q. A proxy that approximates Tobin’s Q; calculated as the book value of total 
assets, plus the market value of common equity, minus the sum of the book value of 
common equity and deferred taxes, all divided by the book value of total assets.
Sharpe Ratio. A risk-adjusted index; defined as the average excess return per unit of total 
risk (Sharpe, 1966).
Size. A symbol measuring firm size. It is calculated as the logarithm of total assets. 
Solvency. A financial construct indicating the capital structure of the firm.
Time Effects. It states that there are significant differences over time due to the 
technological advancements, taste changes, general économie variations.
Tobin’s Q. A value-based firm performance measure; defined as the ratio of the year-end 
total market value of the firm to the estimated replaeement costs of its assets (Tobin, 
1969).
Treynor Ratio. A risk-adjusted index; defined as the average excess return per unit of 
systematic risk (Treynor, 1965).
10
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Summary
The importance and necessity of the hospitality financial management were discussed 
in this chapter. The significance and contribution of an investigation of firm-wise 
financial constructs and firm performance for the hospitality firms were further 
illustrated. The terms used throughout this dissertation were defined. Next, a review of 
related literature is discussed in Chapter 2.
11
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews relevant literature with regard to the relationship between firm 
performance and firm-wise financial factors. The first section discusses various 
theoretical and empirical foundations in details with respect to these relationships. The 
firm performance measures are reviewed in the second section, followed by a summary 
of the literature that was reviewed.
The Relationships Between Firm-wise 
Financial Factors and Firm Performance 
Financial literature has explored the impacts of common financial characteristics, 
such as capital structure and dividend policy on firm performance from a micro 
perspective; that is, financial factors that differ across each firm and are under 
management’s influence. Reviews of these firm-wise financial factors and their 
relationships with firm performance follow, beginning with a factor relating to liquidity.
Liquiditv
Liquidity measures a firm’s ability to meet its short-term obligations and the 
quickness and certainty of an asset to be converted into cash at its fair market value 
(Scott, Martin, Petty, & Keown, 1999). Liquidity is one of the firm’s key asset 
management strategies to create shareholder value. According to Moyer, McGuigan, and
12
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Kretlow (2001), companies hold liquid assets for a number of reasons. First, because cash 
flows fluctuate, a firm needs to maintain sufficient amount of liquid assets to run its daily 
operations, such as paying salaries and wages to employees, repaying liabilities to 
creditors, governments, suppliers and so forth. Liquid assets help a firm to handle the 
variations in cash flow. This is a transactional reason. A precautionary approach to 
owning some extra liquid assets to minimize potential bankruptcy cost is a second 
motive. Bankruptcy costs work against the shareholders who are the residual claimers on 
assets in liquidation (Van Home, 2001). If a firm's liquid assets decrease dramatically, 
management must make sure that adequate future cash is available to meet the maturing 
obligations. Any organization that can not meet minimum liquidity requirements would 
experience great financial difficulty. Third, liquid assets are often held for speculative 
reasons. Liquid assets can help a firm make quick investment when there is a great 
market opportunity. Firms ean often take cash discounts offered by many suppliers and 
pay off higher interest expenses with adequate liquid assets. Investment in liquid assets 
can minimize eostly external finaneing (Kim, Mauer, & Sherman, 1998). Finally, it is 
easier to determine the value of liquid assets and use them as collateral so that firms with 
liquid assets can raise fimds more readily and under better terms (Haubrich & Santos, 
1997). In essence, firms hold liquid assets to control certain shortage costs associated 
with the lack of adequate liquid assets as liquidity shortage costs inversely relate to 
liquidity.
Nevertheless, a firm would not maintain too many liquid assets because doing so 
could also hurt the firm’s development and future performance for several possible 
reasons. First, more liquid assets may create more severe agency problems than less
13
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liquid assets (Jensen, 1986). Agency problems occur when the management (the agent) 
acts in a manner to maximize its own welfare other than the owners of the firm (the 
principal) because of the separation of the ownership and control in the modem corporate 
system. It is easier for managers to advance their own interests at the owners’ expense 
when there is an abundant supply of liquidity assets. Second, liquid assets in general earn 
relatively low rates of return compared to other assets (Moyer et al., 2001). High liquidity 
might imply that available resources are not being wisely invested by the management 
(Borde, 1998). Firms can increase the expected return on assets by minimizing its liquid 
asset allocation. Third, investment in liquid assets is costly because the firm must pay 
non-trivial transaction costs to buy and sell liquid assets and because the firm may have 
higher taxation (Kim et al., 1998). Higher liquidity lowers the firm’s ability to generate 
more returns; therefore, firms hold only a certain amount of liquid assets to limit the 
holding costs associated with the excess of liquid assets. Thus, a positive correlation 
exists between holding costs of liquid assets and liquidity.
In sum, liquidity could have both a positive and negative impact on firm performance. 
The objective of effective liquidity management is to find an optimal balance between 
liquid and illiquid assets to enhance firm performance (i.e., minimize the total liquidity 
costs), being aware of the trade-offs between costs and benefits. In fact, the determination 
of optimal liquid assets reflects the classic risk versus return relations (Moyer et al., 
2001). Larger amounts of liquid assets are associated with lower risks and returns and 
vice verse. Total liquidity costs consist of both shortage and holding costs of liquid 
assets. The opposite impacts of between shortage costs and holding costs on liquidity 
generate the U-shaped relationship between liquidity and its total costs which is
14
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confirmed by Gilmer’s (1985) study. Consequently, there is an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between liquidity and firm performance as costs are negatively related to 
performance. The optimal level of liquidity is the amount for which the marginal 
opportimity cost of liquid assets holdings equals the expected costs of liquidity shortage 
(Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999). Bruinshoofd and Kool (2004) confirm the 
existence of long-run liquidity targets at the firm level.
There is also empirical evidence with respect to the relationship between liquidity and 
firm performance. Some studies have suggested a positive relationship. Myers (1977) 
posited that maintaining excess liquidity may help to reduce the firm’s distress, thus 
enhancing the firm value. Further, Baskin (1987) provided empirical evidence that liquid 
assets are used to signal staying power to retaliate against encroachment and to allow 
firms to rapidly grasp new opportunities. Opler et al. (1999) examined the determinants 
of liquid assets holdings of publicly traded U.S. firms in the 1971 -  1994 period. They 
reported evidence that firms with excess liquidity generally have precautionary motives 
to maximize the shareholder’s wealth which is considered a positive association. In 
contrast. Shin and Soenen (1998) empirically investigated the relations between liquidity 
and firm performance using a COMPUSTAT sample of American firms during 1975 -  
1994. The relationships were examined using correlation and regression analysis, by 
industry and working capital intensity. They found a strong negative relation between 
liquidity and firm performance. The authors thus suggested that lowering liquidity to a 
reasonable minimum could be one way to increase shareholder value.
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Solvency
Solvency measures a firm's capital structure, i.e., the relative percentage between debt 
and equity instruments used to finance its assets. Solveney assesses a firm’s reliance on 
debt and reflects the firm's ability to meet debt obligation and exposure to the financial 
risk on a long-term horizon. Finance literature strongly indicates that changes in a firm’s 
capital structure can greatly affect firm value (Pinegar & Wilbricht, 1989). Using debt 
can significantly amplify the results of the activities undertaken by a firm. A firm’s 
performance ean be leveraged from bad to worse or from good to great by using higher 
levels of debt. Debt and equity each have unique charaeteristies. Debt financing has tax- 
deductible benefits at the cost of being embedded with potential financial distress costs. 
Equity, on the other hand, usually asks for more returns than debt though the original 
vested funds are retained in the company. The goal of solvency management is to craft a 
good mixture between debt and equity financing so as to minimize the cost of capital and 
thereby maximize value of the firm. Managers should fine tune the debt proportion to 
fulfill such a goal. Further, there are several theories with respect to the eapital structure 
in practice; namely, the optimal (target) capital structure model, the pecking order 
hypothesis, and the signaling effects proposition.
The optimal capital structure tradeoff theory suggests that cost of capital is negatively 
related to the tax shield of debt, but positively related with financial risk and agency costs 
incurred with the use o f debt when corporate taxes, financial distress costs and agency 
costs are included (Moyer et al., 2001). It proposes a U-shaped relationship between a 
firm’s average cost of capital and use of debt. That is, adding debt in the beginning will 
lower the cost of capital; but the cost of capital will later increase when percentage of
16
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debt in financing mix exceeds a certain point. Such a point is usually referred as target 
capital structure ratio. The equilibrium point arrives when the marginal cost of additional 
debt is the same as the marginal benefits of additional debt.
On the other hand, the pecking order hypothesis developed by Myer (1984) argues 
that a firm's capital structure changes when an imbalance between net cash flows and 
investment opportunities occurs. The pecking order hypothesis indicates that firms have 
no partieular optimal capital structure and they prefer internal financing (retained 
earnings) to debt, and finally to external common equity as a last resort (Moyer et al., 
2001). A survey conducted by Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) reports that pecking order 
theory is more representative of how finaneing decisions are made in practice. However, 
as indicated by Van Home (2001), pecking order is mainly a behavioral explanation of 
why some companies finance through such orders. The pecking order hypothesis reflects 
managers’ preferences in choosing capital structure.
The real world is characterized by asymmetric information between managers 
(agents) with more information and shareholders (owners) with less information as a 
whole. The signal theory described by Ross (1977) implies that a firm with better 
outlooks can issue more debt to avoid sharing the benefits of the favorable prospects with 
new shareholders. Unless a firm has a good investment opportunity it would not issue 
debt because the issue of debt would result in a higher probability of bankruptcy. A firm, 
therefore, may issue debt to signal to the market that management has perceived great 
projects, which are expected to generate sufficient eash flows to service the debt, as well 
as enhance the firm value. Management intentionally links benefits in the best interest of 
shareholders because issuing debt will affect the market price of the firm and
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management compensation package is closely connected with the firm performance.
More debts are preferred within the framework of signaling effect theory. Based on the 
signal theory, a positive relationship is expected between debt levels and firm 
performance.
Optimal capital structure theory will conventionally hold as an inverted U-shape 
relationship between solvency and firm performance. The expected sign can be either 
positive or negative. Adding debt initially will enhance the performance as the benefits of 
tax shield outweigh the financial distress and agency costs. The trend will reverse when 
debt reaches a certain optimal point when financial distress and agency costs are soaring. 
The pecking order hypothesis and signaling effect propositions behaviorally explain why 
and how some firms finance the resourees, which provide important insight into the 
knowledge of capital structure theory.
Empirical studies have yielded conflicting evidence regarding the relationship 
between solvency and firm performance. For instance, Grossman and Hart (1986), and 
Zantout (1997) asserted higher levels of debt usage will be positively associated with 
higher levels of firm performance. Similarly, Roenfeldt and Cooley (1978), Harris and 
Raviv (1990) suggested lower financial leverage was significantly associated with lower 
firm performance. However, John (1993) empirically showed a negative and significant 
relationship between leverage and a firm's performance using 223 Fortune 500 firms in 
1980. Likewise, Capon, Farley, and Hoenig (1990) reported that 90 out of 140 
relationships examined in their studies have shown a negative correlation between firm 
debt level and its performance. The reason is that financial distress costs (bankruptcy 
costs and agency costs of debt) increase the cost of capital and destroy firm value.
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Moreover, the poor performance associated with debt use is beeause debt holders are 
assumed to be more risk averse than shareholders whieh may force managers to abandon 
all risky projects and cut research and development expenses to be conservative (Capon 
et al, 1990). Thus, increased leverage eould worsen the firm’s financial performance. On 
the other hand, results from Forster (1996) uphold the traditional capital structure theory 
that the relation between leverage and firm performance is non-linear, using the panel 
data of 56 agribusinesses from 1984 to 1993 in the US.
Activitv
The activity factor measures the effectiveness and efficiency of the management team 
in using and controlling different firm assets over a certain period of time. Activity 
indicates how rapidly non cash assets flow through a firm and how quickly these assets 
generate revenues (Moyer et al., 2001). One objective of financial management is to 
allocate the best mix among the various asset accounts (Moyer et al., 2001). By 
comparing the activity indicators for different assets, the firm can assess the effectiveness 
and efficiency of asset allocation. There is a consensus in regard to the direct positive 
relationship between activity and firm performance. An increase in effective and efficient 
use of assets will lead to value incremental in a firm; hence, improving its performance. 
For example, Roenfeldt and Cooley (1978) confirmed that a lower activity ratio is 
significantly associated with lower firm performance,
Growth
Growth presents an outlook of a firm’s future earning capabilities, which is a key 
benchmark held by investors and creditors. The purpose of the growth is to create more 
wealth for the owners through exploring emerging opportunities, improving efficiencies.
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withstanding market fluctuations, increasing bargaining power and succeeding in 
competition with other firms. The growth factor may capture both business cycle and 
economic development effects. However, Borde (1998) cautions that growth should be 
carefully managed to ensure both internal structure and control of firm operations. A firm 
can expand its business through internal growth, external development, or merger and 
acquisition.
In theory, growth can affect firm value both positively and negatively. Firms with 
growth capacity might generate increased market share and/or synergy effects, thereby 
leading to favorable performance. The positive relationship between growth and firm 
financial performance was tested and suggested by several researchers (Child, 1972; 
Keats & Hitt, 1988). On the other hand, growth strategies often were criticized for 
destroying firm value. One possible reason could be that management can increase 
control, power and compensation through growth with no regard for shareholders' 
benefits. For example. Hill and Jones (1995) indicate that firms might pursue the growth 
at the expense of an owner's wealth. Fast-growth firms may be confronted with increased 
competition and are more sensitive to economic fluctuations (Logue & Merville, 1972). 
Idol (1978) suggests that investors perceive high growth firms as being more risky. In 
addition to risk, growth can only bring in an increase in return to a certain point, beyond 
which firms can not develop further because of the capacity limitation. The rising risk 
associated with capacity constraints may strain a firm’s limited resources and its ability to 
structure effective internal controls, thereby destroying firm value. It is the job of 
management to balance growth and potential risk and seek the proper growth strategy to 
fit their needs.
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Many studies have shown a positive relationship between growth and firm 
performance. For instance, Roenfeldt and Cooley (1978) suggested lower growth is 
significantly associated with lower firm performance. In an attempt to explore the 
relationship between growth and firm value, Varaiya and Kerin (1987) provided support 
that growth variables are consistently positive in relation to firm value. Such an 
association was also verified by Capon et al. (1990). After meta-analyzing 88 previously 
published studies. Capon et al. (1990) concluded that growth has shown a positive 
relationship to performance. In the hospitality industry, Jekanowski (1999) pointed out 
growth strategies have helped many restaurant firms sustain their success over the past 
four decades. Not only does McDonalds strive to achieve visibility in all possible 
locations, but other firms such as Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) and Burger King have 
also extended their market share and dominance through growth both in the US and 
overseas. The recent frenzy of mergers and acquisitions within the casino industry might 
confirm such a perspective.
Alternatively, a number of researchers have warned of dangers of firm growth from 
market pressures, which lead to damaging firm value in the long run (Fuller & Jensen, 
2002; Ghemawat & Ghadar, 2000). Ramezani, Soenen, and Jimg (2002) reported 
empirical evidence that maximizing growth does not necessarily maximize firm value. 
This conclusion was drawn from the study of using US companies data from 1990-2001. 
Their findings revealed that shareholder’s wealth was a concave function of growth, or a 
commonly named inverted U-shaped curve. The study further suggests that companies 
with moderate growth show the highest value creation for their owners. Investors will be 
sensitive to any firm with dramatic changes in growth. Additionally, according to the
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study by Brush, Bromiley, and Hendrickx (2000), the relationship between growth and 
firm performance could depend on the interaction of a firm’s free cash flow (FCF) and 
other business situations. Findings showed that growth helps increase firm performance 
for those firms that are without FCF or with low levels of FCF and without strong 
governance or owner managed firms with low levels of FCF. In a rare situation, Gupta 
(1969) observed no significant correlation between growth and performance using US 
manufacturing data from 1961 to 1962.
Profitabilitv
Profitability measures how well management makes investment and financial 
decisions to generate profits (Moyer et al., 2001). Profits show the past earnings. In 
addition, profitability is likely to be distorted by data manipulation from accounting 
“window dressing” effects in accounting convention and tax procedures. Profitability 
emphasizes internal management efficiency, which reflects managers’ perspectives 
whereas financial performance echoes the future expectations of existing and potential 
shareholders.
Theoretically, there should be a direct strong positive relationship between 
profitability and firm performance in general as expected earnings ultimately reflect the 
intrinsic stock prices. However, empirical studies provide imperfect results on this issue. 
Some research suggests that relationship between profitability and firm performance is 
artificial at best. They cast great doubt on the attempt of correlating profitability and 
financial performance, by suggesting the relation could be misleading (Sharpe, 1999). 
O’Connor (1973) applied a stepwise multiple regression to a holdout sample to determine 
the ability of historical data to forecast financial performance. He concluded that
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commonly used financial constructs, including profitability, were not useful to predict 
firm financial performance. However, most studies have documented a positive 
relationship (Jacobson, 1987; Varaiya & Kerin, 1987). For example, a study by 
Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Moesel (1993) reported such a correlation. Hoskisson et al. 
(1994) further confirmed that past performance (measured in accounting profitability) 
was a good predictor of future performance (measured in financial performance 
measures). They noted that profitability information appeared to be immediately reflected 
in market performance. Fryxell and Barton (1990) found that relation between 
profitability and financial performance varies over time and context. Nevertheless, the 
general perspective of positive correlation between profitability and financial 
performance may be distorted for certain specific reasons. For example, a seemingly 
contradictory relation of lower profitability level with relative high stock valuation in the 
Japanese stock market can be largely explained by some uncommon reasons (Ide, 1996). 
Their firms concentrated on growth in profit size rather than efficiency. The Japanese 
government encouraged an export first policy. The interlocking relationship between 
banks and firms further significantly reduced the risk. In fact, Japanese stocks were really 
like a quasi fixed income instrument (Ide, 1996). In the US, the internet stock bubble in 
the late 1990s revealed the huge discrepancy between expectations and reality. Many 
analysts and investors used the so-called “life value” of a customer technique to 
determine a valuation based on hopes for future profits which can not be justified by any 
accounting procedures (Fortune, 1999). In a rare case, a study by Keats and Hitts (1988) 
reported a significantly negative relationship between profitability and firm performance. 
The authors explain that financial performance measures react and incorporate the effects
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of anticipated positive or negative major events before the actual occurrence. When 
positive events occur, investors may actually anticipate a downturn because they believe 
a firm has reached its peak. Thus, profitability and financial performance might differ. In 
addition, dynamic environments will affect profits negatively and financial performance 
positively. The collection of these factors may contribute an inverse relationship between 
profitability and financial performance measures.
Management Ownership 
According to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory, managers may act in their 
ovm interests rather than the interests of shareholders. One way to mitigate the agency 
problem between principal (owners) and agent (managers) is to increase the managerial 
stock ownership so a manager’s compensation is directly related to firm performance 
(i.e., stock price). Such an effective compensation contract utilizing managerial 
ownership can align the goal of managers with that of shareholders in a rational and 
efficient capital market. Managerial stock ownership can not only align managers’ 
common interests, thereby tying the managers to the firm, but also provide good 
incentives for managers with outstanding performance records. This convergence-of- 
interest hypothesis suggests that firm value will increase in accordance with the augments 
of managerial ownership. Nevertheless, entrenchment effects will take place when 
managers hold a large portion of a firm’s stock. Under this circumstance management has 
the voting power to guarantee their jobs and may pursue non-value-maximizing behavior 
(Belkaoui & Pavlik, 1992). Two possible arguments can support the notion of 
entrenchment effects which were pointed out by Sundaramurthy, Rhoades, and Rechner 
(2005). First, increased share ownership may add extra risk to managers who are usually
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risk averse, which may result in risk-reducing behavior that is against the shareholders’ 
best interest. Second, managers can control many of their own destinies and avoid the 
takeovers by outsiders by controlling a large portion of a firm’s shares. Thus, there could 
be a negative relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance.
Empirically, some studies find a significant positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance. Kim, Lee, and Francis (1988) randomly selected a 
sample of 157 firms from the Value Line Investment Survey during 1975 to 1978 and 
confirmed that firms with high degrees of managerial ownership enjoyed abnormal return 
to the firms with diffuse ownership. Hudson, Jahera, and Lloyd (1992) further supported 
the notion that managerial ownership is a significant factor positively related to the stock 
return. However, other researchers (Lloyd, Jahera & Goldstein, 1986; Tsetsekos & 
Defusco, 1990) reported an insignificant relationship between them. Moreover, Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) suggested a nonlinear relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance. A positive followed by a negative and then a positive 
correlation was presented. McConnell and Servaes (1990) also suggested such a non­
monotonic relationship. As concluded by Kesner (1987), the association of managerial 
holdings on firm performance differs across industries. The results of his study revealed a 
significant positive relationship exists between managerial ownership and firm 
performance for high-growth industries, whereas no significant relationship for low 
growth industries was found.
Institutional Ownership
With a huge stake in all outstanding equity in the US currently (Hayahsi, 2003), 
institutional investors have become powerful and important in corporate management
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decisions (Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1998). Two theoretical arguments have evolved in 
the literature to reveal the relationship between institutional investment and firm 
performance (Sundaramurthy et al., 2005). The efficiency augmentation view posits a 
positive relationship for at least two reasons. First, institutional investors typically have 
obtained through knowledge about the firms they invest in by hiring professionals to 
manage their vested portfolios with economies of scale. Second, institutional investors 
have the incentives and expertise in monitoring the managerial behaviors at relative costs. 
They can express their concerns about firm performance with the management team. In 
essence, institutional investors represent a group of individual investors with a collective 
influence to affect and vote on management decisions (Tsai, 2005). Hence, an increase in 
institutional ownership will enhance the external monitoring and help align management 
interests with larger ownership’s (i.e., institutional investors) interests. Therefore, a 
significant and positive correlation between institutional ownership and firm performance 
exists.
Alternatively, the efficient abatement hypothesis posits a negative relationship 
between institution investors and firm performance because investors are passive, 
collusive or myopic (Sundaramurthy et al., 2005). Institutional investors are passive 
because they have certain legal restrictions designed to control firms (Roe, 1990). 
Institutional investors may also conspire with firm managers against beneficiaries 
because they have certain business interests in the firms they invest in (Pound, 1988). 
Furthermore, institutional investors tend to be myopic and focus mainly on short-term 
performance (Bushee, 1998).
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Additionally, there could be no significant relationship between ownership structure 
and firm performance because a firm’s ownership structure can be endogenously 
determined to maximize firm value (Demsetz, 1983). Diffuse ownership may aggravate 
potential agency problems but generate compensating advantages that offset such 
problems (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).
Numerous studies have shown inconclusive results with respect to how institutional 
ownership may affect firm performance. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) failed to provide 
enough evidence to support the positive proposition of institutional ownership on firm 
performance using a list of 383 Fortune 800 firms in 1987 by both ordinary least square 
(OLS) and 2 way simultaneous least square (2SLS) regression techniques. By probing 
the relations between institutional ownership and firm performance with a sample of 
Australian firms in 1986 and 1989 respectively, Craswell, Taylor, and Say well (1997) 
found a non-significant effect of institutional ownership on firm performance after 
controlling other variables, such as the debt ratio and research and development (R&D) 
expenditures, to name a few. Clay (2001) investigated 8,951 firms between 1988 and 
1999 and found a significantly positive impact of institutional ownership on firm 
performance both in OLS and 2SLS models. Han and Suk (1998) tested the effect of 
institutional ownership on firm performance using 301 firms during 1988-1992 and 
concluded that institutional ownership can positively contribute to firm performance. 
Other studies, such as McConnell and Servaes’ (1990) also confirmed that institutional 
ownership is a significant and positive determinant of firm performance. On the other 
hand, some studies found a negative association (Coles & Hesterly, 2000; Graves, 1988).
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Dividend Policy
Dividend decisions are one of three major financial decisions that any firm will 
encounter. Dividend policy determines how to distribute firm earnings. Earnings can be 
retained and reinvested in the company to stimulate the future growth, hence influencing 
the future share values of its common stock. Alternatively, earnings can be distributed to 
shareholders as current returns.
According to Gordon and Shapiro (1956) and Gordon (1963), the so-called “bird-in- 
the-hand” theory posits that firms distribute dividend to reduce investors’ uncertainty, 
causing a low discount rate to firms’ future earnings, thereby increasing firms’ values 
(Moyer et al., 2001). Conversely, firms that do not pay out dividend could raise investors’ 
uncertainty. As a result, the discount rate will increase and the stock prices will decrease. 
A cut in dividend payment usually results in decline in stock price because it signals and 
conveys the information regarding the potential unreliability of future earnings. Agency 
theory also suggests that dividend payouts can reduce agency costs between management 
and shareholders because the payment of dividend cut the available amounts of retained 
earnings for management’s discretionary use (Moyer et al., 2001). This scenario was 
conjectured by Jensen (1986) as a free cash flow hypothesis. In other words, more 
dividend payouts or less free cash flow is usually associated with better firm 
performance. Thus, a positive relationship between dividend payouts and firm 
performance is expected from both agency theory and “bird-in-hand-theory”.
However, some growth companies have maintained high earnings to obtain lower 
capital costs according to the pecking order hypothesis in the capital structure as 
mentioned previously. Further, firms have increased financial flexibility which enables
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them to adopt the best strategy to enhance value. Firms that do not distribute cash 
dividend may also signal to investors that the company holds a very positive expectation 
regarding earnings and cash flow in the future which is at least better than the expected 
future market returns were the dividend distributed in cash (Moyer et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, dividend retention is preferred over payouts considering that personal tax 
rate on capital gains is less than that on cash dividend income (Van Home, 2001). A 
dividend-paying stock needs to provide a higher expected before tax return for investors 
to accept dividends. Thus, these arguments will lead to a negative correlation between 
dividend payouts and firm performance.
The competing theoretical arguments of dividend policy upon firm performance yield 
mixed empirical evidence. Many recent studies have found that dividend policies have no 
significant or neural impact on stock price (Christie, 1990; Benartzi, Michaely, & Thaler, 
1997). Alternatively, Naranjo, Nimalendran, and Ryngaert (1998) reported a significant 
positive relationship between dividend yield and stock returns, which implies a negative 
effect of dividend payout on firm value. Conversely, using a sample of hotel REITs and 
non-REIT firms from 1993 to 1999, Mooradian and Yang (2001) suggested a positive 
impact of dividend payout on firm performance.
Business Diversification
Over the last four decades, the impact of business diversification on firm performance 
has drawn voluminous attention from many researchers in a number of business 
disciplines, including industrial economics, strategic management, and finance. Several 
theoretical arguments resulted with respect to the reason why firms diversify 
(Montgomery, 1994). The first relates to available resources which focus on a firm’s
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internal resources and capabilities. The second deals with market power advantages. Both 
resource building and market power are consistent with profit maximization. The third is 
involved with agency theory. Divergent interests between management and shareholders 
and the existence of asymmetric information may contribute to the diversification 
strategies that could shrink firm value. According to Berger and Ofek (1995), 
diversification has both value enhancing and value reducing effects theoretically and 
there is an unclear direction about the overall effect of diversification on firm 
performance. On one hand, diversification across industries and countries can stabilize 
the return and lessen the risk. For example, Shaked (1986) posited that multi-national 
firms tend to have both lower systematic and imsystematic risk than domestic firms. 
Belkaoui and Pavlik (1992) examined 228 Fortune 500 firms and indicate that 
diversification can enhance firm performance. However, by investing the funds in a 
diversified portfolio, shareholders can manufacture such a combination bn their own 
easier and cheaper (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2006). A well diversified firm could have 
an efficient internal market for capital and labor. Free cash flow from mature industries 
(i.e., cash cows) can be directed to the growth industries within the firm, thereby 
lowering financing costs (Brealey et al., 2006). In addition, the benefits of diversification 
may also include greater operating efficiency, less likeliness to forego positive net 
present value projects, greater debt capacity and favorable taxes (Berger & Ofek, 1995). 
On the other hand, some researchers have suggested the adverse value consequences of 
diversification (Singh, Mathur, Gleason, & Etebari, 2001). The rising capital market 
sophistication, reduced regulation, and more transparent information have lowered the 
benefits of diversification (Markides, 1995). The costs of diversification may consist of
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the use of increased resources to undertake value-decreasing projects, cross-subsidies of 
poor segments from better-performing segments, and misallocation of incentives among 
different segments in the firm (Berger & Ofek, 1995). Further, over-diversification could 
generate negative synergy and diseconomies of scope which ultimately destroy firm 
value (Singh et al., 2001).
Researchers have tried to assess whether business diversification can add or destroy 
firm value empirically. Some studies have contended that business diversification may 
diminish firm value (Bettis, 1981; Comment & Jarrell, 1994; Lang & Stulz, 1994). 
Berger and Ofek (1995) estimated that diversification obliterates 13-15 percent firm 
value on average during 1986 to 1991, which might be due to the overinvestment and 
misallocation of investment. De (1992), however, failed to find a significant correlation 
between business diversification and firm value. In contrast, other researchers have 
indicated a positive relationship (Keats & Hitt, 1988). For instance. Campa and Kedia 
(2002) and Villalonga (2004) provided evidence that diversification may enhance 
shareholder wealth. Moreover, Palich, Cardinal, and Miller (2000) synthesized findings 
from 55 previously published articles addressing the relationship between business 
diversification and firm performance. Their results indicated a curvilinear model 
(inverted U-shape) so that moderate levels of business diversification yield higher levels 
of firm performance.
Geographical Diversification
Firms often diversify geographically to take advantage of their excess capacity of 
resources to benefit from scales of economy, as managers know and learn the knowledge 
and skills over time (Kor & Leblebici, 2005). Essentially, as a firm tries to realize the
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benefits of economies of scope from client-specific knowledge and other common 
tangible and intangible resources, partners absorb the internal transaction and adjustment 
costs of coordinating and performing in multiple places (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004). In 
addition, Capar and Kotabe (2003) enumerated several possible reasons why firms 
diversify geographically as: cheap labor costs; market access and opportunities; 
standardizing products and services; allocating resources more effectively and efficiently; 
and increased bargaining power. On the other hand, a high level of geographical 
diversification will increase operation costs according to transaction cost theory (Hitt, 
Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997). Factors such as logistics, trade barriers, culture heterogeneity, 
government regulation, trade laws, currency fluctuations, organizational complexity, 
information and transaction costs will dampen firm development and affect firm 
performance negatively (Capar & Kotabe, 2003).
Empirical evidence has generated various results, indicating there are several general 
models in the existing research stream about this topic. The first suggests geographic 
diversification is associated with linear and positive shareholder return (Bodnar, Tang, & 
Weintrop, 1998; Tallman & Li, 1996). In contrast, a second view reflects a negative 
relationship between diversification and firm value. For example, Denis, Denis, and Yost 
(2002) demonstrated global diversification destroyed shareholder value by 18 percent. A 
third viewpoint indicates an insignificant relationship (Errunza & Senbet, 1984). 
Recently, many studies have revealed that the relationship between geographic dispersion 
and firm performance is non-monotonic. In particular, a fourth perspective contends that 
an inverse U-shape curvilinear relationship exists (Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999; Hitt et 
al., 1997), where performance increases up to a certain point and then goes down. The
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slope of the curve is initially positive and after reaching an apex, becomes negative.
Firms can achieve economies of scale, scope, and location if they undertake their initial 
expansion in a homogenous environment. Later, when the firms enter the heterogeneous 
markets, performance will go down because the increased organizational and 
environmental complexity will elevate the operating costs (Li, 2005). On the other hand, 
a fifth opinion has found a U-shape relationship between geographical dispersion and 
firm performance (Ruigrok & Wagner, 2003), which is just the reverse of the fourth 
perspective. Capar and Kotabe (2003) also support a U-shape curvilinear relationship 
based on 81 major German service firms. Firms may encounter high adaptation costs 
before they can enjoy the benefits of geographical diversification (Li, 2005).
Size
Size is a mediating factor that needs to be accounted for in this study. The 
relationship between firm-wise factor and performance will vary systematically, given 
the different levels of firm size. Different explanations coexist with respect to the effect 
of firm size on firm performance. On one hand, large firms tend to possess more 
resources and better chances to take advantage of the environment and capital market; 
i.e., to expand the business during an economic boom or/and withstand market 
fluctuations during an economic downturn. In addition, firm may gain from an increase in 
size due to more reasonable economies of scale, more promotional opportunities, 
improved efficiency in assets, capital, technology management and other operational 
synergies. However, increased size may aggravate corporate red tape and result in a 
dysfunction of managing the personnel and other resources. Small firms are more flexible 
to adapt to ever-changing demands. The Fama and French (1993) model indicates size
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will negatively and significantly affect firm performance. These two conflicting 
propositions suggest that the relationship between firm size and performance depends on 
specific situations. Thus, in practice, firm size usually has to be controlled in order to 
compare firm performance (Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; Keats & Hitt, 1988).
Some empirical research also yielded mixed results. Gupta (1969) observed smaller 
firms tend to have a lower performance. Keating (1997) also suggested that firm size is 
positively related to firm performance. However, Miller (1987) investigated different 
industries and reports that productivity is unrelated to firm size in the service industries. 
In Wu (2006)’s meta analysis of relationship among firm social performance, financial 
performance and firm size, the author revealed that there is no significant relationship 
between firm size and financial performance.
As reviewed by Obi (1994), total assets are the second best indicator for firm size, 
just after the market value of firm's equity. Since market value is closely associated with 
this study’s dependent variable (i.e., financial performance), total assets in its logarithm 
form is chosen to condense the extremely large value of a variable. This approach is a 
standard practice to develop a proxy for firm size.
Industrv Effects
Each industry has its own distinct characteristics. Some are labor intensive while 
others are capital intensive. Some are fast growing businesses while others exist in 
already saturated markets. In an attempt to estimate the relative importance of industry, 
focus, and share effects on firm performance, Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) 
confirm that industry effects are the major factors of firm success. That is to say, it is 
deemed to be appropriate to compare firm performance within a homogeneous industry.
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rather than a heterogeneous group. Further, Hawawini, Subramanian, and Verdin (2003) 
find that a significant proportion of variation in firm factors is due to the presence of a 
few exceptional firms in any industry. In other words, for most ordinary firms, the 
industry effects appear to be more important for performance than firm-specific factors. 
Lancaster, Stevens, and Jeimings (1999) conclude that “industry effects are found in 
capital structure, risk, returns, and financial ratio pattern” (p.43). Two major sectors 
within the hospitality industry are restaurants and hotels (including casino hotels), which 
are the focus in the study. A dichotomous variable will be assigned to describe these two 
sectors.
To reiterate, many firm-wise financial factors, (i.e., liquidity, solvency, activity, 
growth, profitability, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, dividend policy, 
business diversification and geographical diversification) have appeared in the literature 
that could affect the firm market performance, with size and industry effects as control 
variables.
Firm Performance Measures Review
Only financial market performance measures will be used in this study to evaluate 
hospitality firm performance as these data are objective, direct and available. Firm 
performance measures are obtained fi’om the stock market data, based on the firm’s future 
expected earnings. From a theoretical perspective, firm performance measures express 
the expected value of future cash flows and may affect firm’s outlook in the long run. In 
addition, these firm performance measures are thought to be robust to the management 
practices and accounting conventions under the efficient market hypothesis. Among a
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substantial number of firm performance measures, Tobin’s Q, as well as some other risk- 
adjusted performance measures, such as the Treynor ratio and the Sharpe ratio, are also 
widely used in the literature.
Tobin's Q is defined as the firm's market value divided by the replacement cost of its 
assets, which is forward-looking, risk adjusted, and less susceptible to changes in 
accounting practices (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Tobin, 1969). Tobin's Q reflects 
the market's prediction of the returns generated per dollar of investment in corporate 
assets (Landsman & Shapiro, 1995) and addresses growing concerns over the limitation 
of accounting measures (Fisher & McGowan, 1983). When the value of Tobin's Q is 
larger than one, a firm is worth more than the cost, meaning excess profits are being 
earned and these profits are above the level necessary to keep the firm in the industry 
(Lindenberg & Ross, 1981). According to Lloyd and Jahera (1994), Tobin's Q takes the 
advantage of minimizing distortions caused by tax laws and accounting procedures often 
related with accounting measures. Tobin's Q measures firm performance involving 
investors’ attitudes (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Over the past several decades, many 
researchers have devised different formulas to measure Tobin's Q: L-R Q (Lindenberg & 
Ross, 1981); Approximate Q (Chung & Pruitt, 1994); and Simple Q (Perfect & Wiles, 
1994), to name just a few. In this study, a Proxy Q (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003) 
will be adopted to measure Tobin's Q for its simplicity and availability of data. Using the 
Proxy Q can avoid possible distortions fi*om the estimation of replacement costs of 
calculating Tobin’s Q (Clay, 2001, Kaplan & Zingales, 1997). Proxy Q can be 
operationally defined as:
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^  {ASSET + E Q U I T Y - { C E + DT))
G = --------------------------------------------------
where:
ASSET, the book value of total assets;
EQUITY: the market value of equity;
CE: the book value of common equity; and,
DT: deferred taxes.
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Gompers et al. (2003), and Clay (2001) also use this Proxy 
Q to measure firm performance in their studies.
Four portfolio performance indexes, namely Treynor ratio, Sharpe ratio, Jensen ratio, 
and Appraisal ratio, have been proposed to measure financial performance on a risk- 
adjusted basis (Reilly & Brown, 1999). Two of these measures (Treynor ratio and Jensen 
ratio) consider only systematic risk as relevant risk factor whereas another two of 
measures (Sharpe ratio and Appraisal ratio) include total risk as a risk factor. Numerous 
previous studies have employed these measures (Dubofsky & Varadarajan, 1987; 
Hoskisson et al., 1994; Michel & Shaked, 1984). These four measures are defined and 
discussed below.
(1) Treynor ratio (Treynor, 1965). This ratio is defined as:
pj> -  ^P’‘ ~  '
where:
PRj. is the Treynor performance ratio;
Rp, is the average rate of return for stock p at time t;
R f , is the average rate of risk free return at time t; and,
/Ip I is the beta for stock p at time t.
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The return for bearing risk, or the excess return over risk-free rate, equals the 
portfolio return ( Rp , ) minus the risk-free return ( R^ , ) in the numerator. Beta ( pp , ) is
the measure of a portfolio's systematic risk in the denominator. The Treynor ratio is based 
on the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964). The ratio 
implicitly assumes a completely diversified portfolio and considers only the systematic 
risk or Beta as the relevant risk in performance measurement within the CPAM 
framework. The Treynor ratio is an index of the average excess return per unit of 
systematic risk. It is thus a reliable performance measure for a well-diversified portfolio 
(Treynor, 1965). Evidently, the higher , the better the firm’s performance.
(2) Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966). This ratio is expressed as:
PRs
where:
PRg is the Sharpe performance ratio;
Rp , is the average rate of return for portfolio p at time t;
R j  I is the average rate of risk-free return at time t; and,
<Tp, is the standard deviation for portfolio p at time t.
The Sharpe ratio divides portfolio risk premium, namely, the difference between the 
portfolio return ( Rp , ) minus the risk-free rate ( Py , ) by its standard deviation or the total
risk. The Sharpe ratio uses the stock’s standard deviation for risk measurement, so it 
considers the total risk rather than just the systematic risk because investors may not hold 
a well-diversified portfolio. Unsystematic risk is pertinent in the formation of the Sharpe 
ratio, which goes beyond the CAPM model. This ratio shows the average excess return 
per unit of total risk and measures the reward to total volatility trade-off. As the Sharpe
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ratio utilizes portfolio standard deviation as relevant risk, it is an appropriate measure for 
both well-diversified and poorly-diversified portfolios (Sharpe, 1966). Theoretically, a 
larger PR^ indicates a better portfolio performance for the reason that total risk may be 
rewarded with relative larger excess return.
(3) Jensen ratio (Jensen, 1968). The Jensen ratio is contained in the equation below: 
i^p,t -  + Pp -  Rf., ) + £p,,
where:
, is the Jensen performance ratio;
Pp is the beta or systematic risk for portfolio p;
Rp, is the average rate of return for portfolio p at time t;
R f , is the average rate of risk-free return at time t;
R„, , is the average rate of market portfolio at time t; and,
Sp , is the random error terms with E{£p,  ) = 0.
The Jensen ratio ( , ), like the Treynor ratio, is also based on the CAPM model that
assumes systematic risk, or beta, as the only relevant risk. As shown in the equation 
above, the Jensen ratio is essentially represented by the intercept in the model that has the 
excess rates of return on the portfolio over the risk-free return (dependant variable) 
regressed against the excess rates of return on the market over the risk-free return 
(independent variable). While a significant and positive , indicates a portfolio is out­
performing against the market, a significant but negative , is a sign of its
underperformance. Similar to the Treynor ratio, the Jenson ratio is an appropriate 
performance measure for a well-diversified portfolio (Jensen, 1968).
(4) Appraisal ratio (Treynor & Black, 1973; Goodwin, 1998). This ratio is defined as 
below:
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R - R
PR,  = - ^ ---------^
°  p - m , t
where:
PR^ is the Appraisal performance ratio;
Rp, is the average rate of return for portfolio p at time t; 
i?„,, is the average rate of market return at time t; and,
CTp_„,, is the standard deviation of excess return for portfolio p at time t.
The appraisal ratio, also known as the information ratio, equals the mean of the 
portfolio’s excess rates of return (i.e., difference between portfolio and market return) on 
the portfolio over the market return against its corresponding standard deviation. The 
numerator represents the excess return whereas the denominator indicates the 
unsystematic risk associated with the pursuit of the excess return (Goodwin, 1998). This 
ratio indicates the average excess return per unit of volatility in excess return. The 
Appraisal ratio is a good measure for all kinds of portfolios, including well-diversified 
and less-diversified portfolios (Goodwin, 1998).
For all these ratios, firms demonstrating a higher, positive value should have a greater 
financial accomplishment. In this study, only the Tobin's Q, the Sharpe and the Treynor 
ratios will be adopted to measure firm performance, as each of them measures value- 
based, total risk-adjusted and systematic risk-adjusted performance, correspondingly.
Summary
Hypothetical arguments and empirical evidence on the relationship between firm- 
wise financial factors and firm performance were presented in Chapter 2. Major firm 
financial performance measures were also discussed. The review of related financial
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literature theoretieally directs the model eonstruction in this study to examine these 
relationships in the hospitality industry. The following chapter will present the research 
design and methodology for this study.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The literature review in Chapter 2 provides both theoretical and empirical foundations 
for using a multiple regression technique to examine the relationship between firm-wise 
financial factors and firm performance in this study. In particular, panel regression 
analysis will be performed because it relates regression techniques with panel data, of 
which are both eross-sectional and time-series. The first section of this chapter will 
present several hypotheses and a model constructed for this study, and the following 
sections will discuss the panel regression method and its underlying assumptions, and 
then demonstrate how to operationalize the model with a sample and data collection.
Hypotheses
The following hypotheses will be tested in this study, which are derived from both the 
research questions stated in Chapter 1 and the literature review in Chapter 2. 
HYPOTHESIS I: The investigated firm-wise financial factors will have impacts on firm 
performance in terms of value-based return in the restaurant sector;
HYPOTHESIS II: The investigated firm-wise financial factors will have impacts on firm 
performance in terms of total risk-adjusted return in the restaurant sector;
HYPOTHESIS III: The investigated firm-wise financial factors will have impacts on firm 
performance in terms of systematic risk-adjusted return in the restaurant sector;
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HYPOTHESIS IV: The investigated firm-wise financial factors will have impacts on 
firm performance in terms of value-based return in the hotel sector;
HYPOTHESIS V : The investigated firm-wise financial factors will have impacts on firm 
performance in terms of total risk-adjusted return in the hotel sector;
HYPOTHESIS VI: The investigated firm-wise financial factors will have impacts on firm 
performance in terms of systematic risk-adjusted return in the hotel sector.
The Proposed Model 
In consideration of both research questions and the related literature that was 
discussed in Chapter 2, the following equation [Eq (1)] is proposed to investigate the 
relationship between firm-wise financial factors and performance. Firm performance is 
the dependent variable and different firm-speeifie financial factors and control variables 
are the independent variables.
(1)
(=1
Where:
Y : firm performance (FP);
Y,...Y ,: liquidity (L), solvency (S), activity (A), growth (G), profitability (P), dividend
payout (D), business diversification (BD), geographical diversification (GD), log of total 
assets (SIZE), respectively; and SIZE is a control variable;
Po: constant;
Pi- Pg: coefficients ofX y ..X g  ; and, 
e: error term.
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A graphical representation of the proposed linear model is presented in Figure 1.
SIZE
GD
FP
BD
Figure 1. The proposed linear model.
Note. L: liquidity, S; solvency, A: activity, G: growth, P: profitability, D: dividend 
payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification. Size: log of total 
assets, FP: firm performance.
Here, different firm performance measures (Tobin’s Q, Sharpe ratio, and Treynor 
ratio) will be entered respectively as the dependent variable in order to capture firm 
performance from various perspectives (value-based return, total risk-adjusted return, and 
systematic risk-adjusted return). This model will be tested for the restaurant and hotel 
sectors separately to account for possible industry effects. Many hospitality firms have 
not paid out dividends, nor implemented either business or geographical diversification 
during this investigated time span (i.e., 2000-2004); hence, data of the aforementioned 
factors were measured dichotomously. Instead of asking how much these factors could 
contribute to firm performance, this study attempts to inquire whether the existence of
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these factors made significant differences in financial performance of the hospitality 
firms. Institutional ownership and managerial ownership will not be examined in this 
study due to their being unavailable in the financial databases. The signs of the 
coefficients of all independent variables are not forecasted beforehand except the factors 
of activity and profitability due to the fact that many contradictory theories about their 
relationship with firm performance coexisted in the literature. The expected signs of the 
coefficients of activity and profitability variables are both positive. Higher values of 
activity and profitability factors would be generally considered as better for firm 
performance as discussed in Chapter 2.
Panel Regression and its Assumptions 
Panel Regression
Observations on many individual economic units, such as firms, over a period of time 
comprise a panel, cross-sectional time-series or longitudinal data set (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Panel data are different from pure cross-section data and pure time-series data. Instead, 
panel data analysis has both a spatial and temporal dimension. The spatial dimension 
involves a group of cross-sectional units of samples, such as individuals and firms. The 
temporal dimension relates to the variables of these cross-sectional groups changing over 
a period of time. Panel data entail the same responding units to be measured at different 
time so that data are dependent. Pooled data, on the other hand, usually take different 
samples over the time and are assumed to be independent. A balanced panel exists when 
the data set has no missing values. If there are some missing values in the data set, it is 
called an unbalanced panel.
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Hsiao (2003) cites literature documenting several advantages o f adopting panel data. 
Firstly, panel data usually contain a larger number of observations than would cross- 
sectional or time-series data, increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing the possible 
multicollinearity among explanatory variables, thereby improving the efficiency and 
reliability of model estimates. Secondly, panel data allow a researcher to analyze a 
number of dynamic relationships which can not be addressed using solely cross-sectional 
data. Similarly, panel data allow one to investigate cross-sectional relations that strictly 
time-series data prohibit. It allows testing or controlling for within subject change over 
time for aggregate data. It provides important detail that aggregated time-series data 
overlook. Thirdly, panel data allow controlling the effects of missing or unobserved 
variables in a more natural way. Omitted variables may lead to changes in time-series and 
cross-section intercepts. For instance, firms may have latent (i.e., unobservable) 
characteristics (e.g., changes in technology, tastes, or business cycle conditions) that 
remain constant among units, but differ over time. With panel data, it is possible to 
control for such types o f omitted variables by observing changes in the dependent 
variable over time (Panel Data, 2006). Therefore, the risk associated with an under­
specified model is greatly mitigated. Finally, panel data allow for more accurate 
predictions for individual outcomes than time series data alone. The major disadvantage 
of panel data analysis is the increased complexity in analysis and interpretations (Hsiao, 
2003).
Panel data has both a cross-sectional and time-series dimension. Therefore, two types 
of perspectives come into play with respect to the differences from either the cross- 
sectional dimension or time-series dimension. When the time dimension is assumed to be
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fixed while the cross-sectional dimension is assumed to be different, it is called unit 
effects model. On the other hand, switching the dimensions will result in time effects 
model (Park, 2005). Unit effects model considers each unit has heterogeneous features, 
such as location, which are either omitted or unobservable. In converse, time effects 
model regards different time has unique dynamics, which plays an important role to 
explain the variance in the model. Generally speaking, the results under these 2 
perspectives are fairly different due to their different underlying assumptions. 
Traditionally the approach in panel data regression has been the unit effects model for 
two obvious reasons. First, most units in a panel are very different for many unobservable 
or immeasurable factors despite these units may come from a homogenous group.
Second, time frame in a panel data set tends to be relative short, say, 5 to 10 years. The 
changes during the period usually are trivial, if not minimal, which can often be 
neglected. Nevertheless, in this study, both unit effects and time effects model are 
examined to ensure the rigors of the study.
As far as the model is concerned, there are several types of panel data models in the 
literature: constant coefficients models, fixed effects models, and random effects models 
(Yaffee, 2003). These are discussed next.
The constant coefficients model is the simplest one because it assumes constant 
coefficients in both intercepts and slopes and estimates a single equation for all cross- 
section and time-series. Because there are no spatial or temporal effects in constant 
coefficient models, the analyst can pool the data to run a normal ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression (Yaffee, 2003). For this reason the constant coefficients model is also 
called the pooled regression model. [Eq (1)] mathematically represents this constant
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coefficients model (i.e., OLS). However, such a strong assumption that neither spatial nor 
temporal effects are significant is rare.
The fixed effects model assumes that each cross-section unit has a unique intercept 
which remains the same for all years, and each time series has its own intercept which 
remains constant across units. The fixed effects model has the same slopes and constant 
variance (error term) but intercepts differ across cross-sectional units or over time (Park, 
2005). The fixed effects regression controls for the effects of omitted variables (i.e., error 
term) which either differ across units or over time. The changes in the variables across 
units or over time thus can be used to estimate the effects of independent variables on the 
dependent variable. Conceptually, the fixed effects model is equivalent to creating a set 
of dummy variables for each unit to control for differences among units or a group of 
time dummy variables to control for differences over time. Thus, the fixed effects models 
use an OLS estimation method, also known as the least-squares dummy variable models. 
Mathematically, fixed effects models can be written as [Eq (2)] with unit effects, or as 
[Eq (3)] with time effects.
N
(2)
1=1 7=1
y  = A  + + (3)
;=1 1=1
Where
Y : firm performance (FP);
...Xg : liquidity (L), solvency (S), activity (A), growth (G), profitability (P), dividend 
payout (D), business diversification (BD), geographical diversification (GD), log of total 
assets (SIZE);
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po: constant; 
pi- Po: coefficient;
Yj or y, : coefficient;
Wj : unit effects dummy variables;
Z, : time effects dummy variables;
T: the number of years;
N: the number of firms; and,
E: e r r o r  t e r m .
The drawback of the fixed effects model is that it may use too many dummy variables, 
which can lower the statistical power and yield multicollinearity problems (Yaffee,
2003).
The random effects regression model estimates variance components (error term) for 
units or time periods with assumptions of the same intercept and slopes (Park, 2005). 
Therefore, it is also called error component model. This model is estimated by either 
generalized least squares (GLS) when the variance structure is known, or feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) when the variance matrix is unknown (Wooldridge, 
2002). The random effects model can be used to mitigate the potential heteroscedasticity 
problem which might be associated with the OLS. In fact, weight-least squares (WLS), as 
part of GLS/FGLS models, is often used to solve heteroscedasticity problem. The random 
effects models provide greater statistical power and parsimony, but they rely on a 
different assumption that the error term is not correlated with the independent variables 
(Yaffee, 2003). Otherwise, the random effects model will be biased even it is efficient. 
Conceptually, fixed effects model examines how the unit and/or time affect the intercept.
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assuming the constant slopes and variance across the units (Park, 2005). The random 
effects model analyzes error variance structures affected by the unit and/or time, 
assuming the same slopes and intercept (Park, 2005). Random effects models can be 
mathematically expressed as [Eq (4)] for unit effects, and as [Eq (5)] for time effects.
9
Y = pQ + ^ p , X i  + s  whereas e  = f^^+e(\ = 1,...,N) (4)
<=i
Y =y#o P i^ i + ^ whereas £ = /i, + e (t = 1,..., T) (5)
1=1
where
Y : firm performance (FP);
X,...Yg : liquidity (L), solvency (S), activity (A), growth (G), profitability (P), dividend 
payout (D), business diversification (BD), geographical diversification (GD), log of total 
assets (SIZE), respectively;
Po: constant;
Pi- pg: coefficient; 
e: general total error term;
//, or : unobservable unit effects or time effects; and,
e : the remainder error term.
Statistically, the fixed effects model is always a good way to start with panel data, 
since it will provide consistent results, but it may not be the most efficient model to use 
(Panel Data, 2006). The random effects model, on the other hand, will generate better P- 
values as it is a more efficient way to estimate the model (Panel Data, 2006). Thus, the 
random effects model is preferred given these statistical justifications. Practically, 
dummy variables play different roles in fixed effects and random effects models. It is a
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fixed effects model if they are treated as a part of the intercept. The random effects model 
considers dummy variables as an error term (Park, 2005). Park (2005) summarizes the 
differences between fixed effects and random effects models in Table 1.
Table 1
Fixed Effects and Random Effects Models
Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model
Functional form* Yu ={cc + ^ i) + X l,p  + v , y,t = a  + K P  + (Fi +L,)
Intercepts
Varying across groups 
and/or time Constant
Error variances Constant
Varying across groups 
and/or time
Slopes Constant Constant
Hypothesis test for model
appropriateness over OLS Incremental F test Breusch-Pagan LM test
Note. * v„ ~ I1D(0,S^ ) ; IID stands for independent identically distributed: adapted from 
Park (2005).
Several tests will be employed to determine which model is most appropriate and the 
test flows are illustrated in Figure 2. Pooled OLS regression will be run first. From two 
separated perspectives (i.e., unit effects and time effects), the Hausman Specification Test 
will be performed to determine which model, fixed effects or random effects is 
appropriate under either unit effects or time effects conditions. Fixed effects and random 
effects models analyses, as well as their significance tests (i.e., incremental F test and the
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Breusch and Pagan LM test) will then be conducted at the end. The results of appropriate 
models will be presented and discussed under both unit- and time-effects viewpoints.
Unit
Effects
Hausman
Test
OLS
Hausman
Test
Time
Effects
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
-► Incremental F Test
-► B-P LM Test
-► Incremental F Test
-> B-P LM Test
Figure 2. Model test procedures flow chart.
An incremental F test (a simple Chow test), based on loss of goodness-of fit is used to 
determine whether a fixed effects model is better than an OLS regression (Park, 2005; 
Baltagi, 2005). It tests the significance of these dummy variables, i.e.,
Hq : fj.^= fi2 = ... = = 0 or //() : r, = ^2 =... = r,_, = 0 (Baltagi, 2005). If the null
hypothesis is rejected, the fixed effects model is preferred. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test (Breusch & Pagan, 1980) can check whether the random effects 
model performs better than OLS regression (Park, 2005). The LM is distributed as chi- 
square with one degree of freedom with its null hypothesis being that cross-sectional 
variance components are zero (Park, 2005). If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the 
normal OLS is appropriate. The Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) is usually 
used to check whether fixed effect or random effects models are most appropriate. In 
particular, it checks a tradeoff between a more efficient model (random effects) and a less
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efficient but more consistent model (fixed effects) to ensure that efficient model can 
produce consistent results (Park, 2005). The Hausman test investigates the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient effects estimator are the same 
as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. A significant P-value will 
suggest a fixed effects model, whereas an insignificant P-value indicates it is safe to use a 
random effects model.
Assumptions Checking
Before data analysis, data screening and assumption checks are necessary for any 
analysis using inferential statistics. Most statistics are built on certain ideal assumptions 
and limitations. After outliers are filtered out of the dataset, checking assumptions will 
follow. Panel regression analysis follows assumptions similar to the normal multiple 
regression technique. The fixed effects model also applies the same OLS estimation as 
the only difference between the normal multiple regression and the fixed effects model is 
that the dummies are added in the fixed effects model to capture the differences among 
the cross-sectional units or the time dynamics. The random effects model differs from the 
normal multiple regression in the assumptions that it does not have the requirement of 
homoscedasticity but the correlations between the error term and independent variables 
are not statistically significantly different from 0 (Park, 2005). In other words, the error 
term and independent variables are assumed to be truly independent.
Normality
The underlying assumption of multiple regression analysis is the multivariate 
normality. Multivariate normality is the assumption that all variables and all 
combinations of the variables are normally distributed. Multivariate normality is difficult
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to test and many statistical software packages do not include such procedures. However 
in regression, when the assumption is met the residuals are normally distributed, the 
differences between predicted and actual scores (the errors) are symmetrically distributed 
around a mean of zero and there is no pattern to the errors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
Therefore, normality can be checked through the scatter plots of the predicted dependent 
variable and actual residuals in regression analysis. As long as there is adequate sample 
size, the normality assumption will not be a serious concern as the central limit theorem 
will hold for a relatively large sample size (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). 
Linearity
An implicit assumption of many statistical tests (including regression techniques) 
based on correlation measures of association is linearity (Hair et al, 1998). If the “true” 
relation is not linear, a linear mode may, but will not always, provide a reasonable 
approximation. Linearity can be examined by inspecting scatter plots of actual residuals 
versus the predicted dependent variable in regression analysis. If the linearity assumption 
is violated, a transformation may be used to mitigate the problem.
Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity is a problem that occurs when variables are too highly correlated 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Statistically, multicollinearity usually influences regression 
results by inflating the standard errors and thereby creating a bias toward overestimating 
the coefficients. Tolerance or the variance inflation factor (VIF) can be used to check for 
multicollinearity. In general dropping some variables out of the analysis which may have 
caused the multicollinearity can often resolve this issue.
Independence of the Error Term
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Traditional OLS regression assumes that the error term is independent. Panel data 
usually have quite strong dependencies among errors by including the temporal 
dimension in the data. As such, the OLS model is no longer the optimal method of 
estimation because the standard errors are biased downward (Hsiao, 2003). In addition, 
the fact that those current values of a certain variable might depend on the past values 
also raises the potential problem of autocorrelation. If the errors have positive 
autocorrelation, panel regression tends to underestimate the variability in the coefficient, 
the standard errors will be smaller than they should be and F tests and the of the 
regression will be inflated. On the other hand, panel regression tends to overestimate the 
coefficient’s variability for the negative autocorrelation, though negative autocorrelation 
rarely occurs in the social sciences. The Wooldridge Wald test can be used to test for 
autocorrelation in panel data models. The panel data with autocorrelation can be resolved 
by first differencing to control for the autocorrelation effects on the residuals 
(Wooldridge, 2002).
Homoscedasticity
Another important relevant assumption is homoscedasticity, the assumption that the 
dependent variable has constant variance across the range of the independent variables. 
When the variance of the error term changes across observations, the data are 
heteroscedastic. Heteroscedasticity only affects the efficiency of estimating the regression 
coefficient while these estimated coefficients remain unbiased (Frees, 2004). In the 
context of panel data, the Breusch and Pagan (1980) test can be used to detect 
heteroscedasticity for the fixed effects model, while the random effects model does not
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require such an assumption. A robust panel model with corrected (robust) standard errors 
can be used to handle heteroscedasticity for the fixed effects model (Wooldridge, 2002).
Variables Selection 
Dependent Variables
Firm performance is the dependent variable in the model and three different measures 
of performance (i.e.. Proxy Q, Sharpe ratio, and Treynor ratio) were selected to use in this 
study. Proxy Q measures firm performance on a value-oriented basis and all the 
stakeholders of the firm care about this value. The Sharpe ratio (S-Ratio) reflects firm 
performance on a total risk-adjusted standard from the market point of view. The Treynor 
ratio (T-Ratio) evaluates firm performance on a systematic risk-adjusted measure based 
on the capital assets pricing model (CAPM). Each of these provides different 
perspectives of firm performance.
Independent Variables
Liquidity is measured by current ratio in this study. The current ratio conventionally 
measures liquidity in the accounting and finance literature (Davis & Peles, 1993; 
Horrigan, 1965; Petes & Schneller, 1989). The current ratio is defined as the relationship 
of a firm’s current assets over current liabilities. Current assets include cash and other 
assets that are to be converted to cash within a year, such as marketable securities, and 
accounts receivable. Current liabilities cover any short-term financial obligations 
expected to be paid within next 12 months, such as accounts payable, and notes payable.
Solvency is represented by debt ratio. The debt ratio is one of the most frequently 
used and effective ratios to show the capital structure of a firm (Grossman & Hart, 1986;
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Harris & Raviv, 1990; Roenfeldt &Cooley, 1978; Zantout, 1997). Debt ratio equals total 
debt dividing by total assets and reflects the percentage of firm’s total liabilities in its 
assets. Total debts include both current liabilities and long-term liabilities. Total assets 
include current assets, long-term assets, and other assets. A high value of the debt ratio 
implies that the firm faces greater financial risks and obligations.
The assets turnover ratio is used in this study for activity. The asset turnover ratio 
uses total sales as a numerator and average total assets as the denominator. It indicates 
how efficiently a firm’s assets produce revenues and the volume of business generated by 
the asset base (i.e., the flow of revenue through the asset pipeline). The asset turnover 
ratio reflects how effectively or the productively the firm’s management is utilizing the 
total assets, which implies the firm’s capital productivity. The assets turnover ratio is 
frequently cited as a key activity ratio in financial/accounting research (Flouris &
Walker, 2005; Imhoff, Lipe, & Wright, 1997; Roenfeldt & Cooley; 1978).
Sales growth serves as the surrogate for firm’s growth in this study. Many other 
authors also have used this variable in the literature as sales usually have a positive and 
meaningful value to work as a base (Keats & Hitt, 1988, Roenfeldt & Cooley, 1978). It is 
defined as the change in a firm's total sales of this observed year over the preceding year. 
This measure suggests to the extent how well a firm's products and services are 
welcomed by the market.
This study uses profit margin as a proxy for profitability. Another popular name for 
profit margin is return on sales. It measures how profitable a firm’s sales are on a 
percentage basis after all other expenses and taxes have been deducted. Capon, Farley, 
and Hoenig (1990) found that return on sales is one of the most widely used profitability
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measures after reviewing 320 studies from 1921 to 1987 and employing meta-analysis to 
summarize the literature on accounting performance to measure profit.
Dividend policy is modeled by a dichotomous variable. If there is no dividend for a 
firm in a certain year, the value is zero. Otherwise, the value is one.
The size variable, measured by log of total assets, is also included in the model to 
account for the potential bias due to different firm size. Following what have been done 
in the previous studies by Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel (1994) or Keats and Hitt 
(1988), logarithmic transformation of total assets can significantly reduce the impact of 
outliers and make data more normally distributed (Hair et al, 1998; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001).
Business diversification and geographic diversification, respectively, are also 
modeled by dichotomous variables. Zero represents no diversification at all and one 
represents the opposite. According to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
(SFAS) No. 14 (Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB], 1976), business segment 
data are reported when an industry is more than 10 percent of a firm’s revenues as part of 
the disclosure requirements. Thus, whenever there are more than two business segments 
for the firm, the value of business diversification will be coded as one. Likewise, SFAS 
No. 14 has also required a firm to disclose geographic segment data if  the foreign sales 
take up more than 10 percent of its total revenue.
Sample and Data
This study includes all active publicly traded hospitality firms with available data 
from both Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT and Center for Research in Security Prices
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(CRSP) databases between 2000 and 2004. The sample firm names and associated tickers 
were first collected through the primary North American Industry Classification System 
(NACIS) codes in COMPUSTAT. In particular, the hotel sector consists of the firms with 
NACIS code number 721110 (Hotels & Motels) and 721120 (Casino Hotels), whereas 
the restaurant sector comprises of these under NACIS code number 722110 (Full-service 
Restaurants) and 722211 (Limited-service Restaurants). COMPUSTAT has all necessary 
information to construct the firm financial factors and Proxy Q for this study. A 
collection of financial variables obtained from COMPUSTAT is listed in Table 2. Table 3 
elaborates how the variables included in the proposed model are computed using 
COMPUSTAT data.
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Table 2
Variables Obtainedfrom COMPUSTAT between 2000-2004
Variable Description
DATA4 Current Assets (MM$)
DATA 5 Current Liability (MM$)
DATA6 Total Assets (MM$)
DATA9 Long-term Debt (MM$)
DATAI 2 Net Sales (MM$)
DATA21 Common Dividend (MM$)
DATA24 Year-end Stock Close Price ($&C)
DATA25 Common Shares Outstanding (MM)
DATA34 Debt in Current Liabilities (MM$)
DATA60 Total Common Equity (MM$)
DATA74 Deferred Taxes on Balance Sheet (MM$)
DATAI 72 Net Income (MM$)
STYPE Segment Type (char)
SNAME Segment Name (char)
SALE Net Sales (MM$) Per Segment
Note. MM is millions; MM$ is millions of dollars; $&C is dollars and cents; char stands 
for characters rather than numbers.
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Table 3
Computation o f  the Variables in the Model
Construct Computation with the data from COMPUSTAT
Proxy Q
Liquidity
Solvency
Activity
Growth
Profitability
(DATA6 + (DATA24 x DATA25) - (DATA60 + DATA74))
DATA6
DATA4
DATA5
(DATA9 + DATA34) 
DATA6
2 XDATAI 2
(Current (DATA6) + Previous (DATA6))
Current (DATA6) 
Previous (DATA6)
DATAI 72 
DATA12
Dividend If DATA21>, D=0; Else, D=1
Business Diversification If (STYPE=BUSSEG and SALE>0), BD=1 ; Else, BD=0
Geographic Diversification If (STYPE=GEOSEG and SALE>0), GD=1 ; Else, GD=0
Next, the firm tickers identified in the first step were used to extract the data of each 
firm’s stock returns and Betas in the CRSP database. The 1 month Treasury Bill return 
was treated as a proxy for risk-free return and was also acquired from the CRSP. The data 
obtained from CRSP (i.e.. Beta, 1 month T-bill return, firm monthly return and standard
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deviation) were used to compute the Treynor ratio (T-Ratio) and Sharpe ratios (S-Ratio) 
according to the formulas illustrated in Chapter 2.
This study tested the relationship between performance and firm-wise factors for the 
most recent 5-year period with publicly available data, namely 2000 to 2004. This time 
span is worthwhile to investigate as 2000 starts the new millennium. Therefore, a panel 
(longitudinal) sample of hospitality firms within the time frame of 2000-2004 was used 
for empirical analysis. There were some missing and erroneous data (such as a blank 
value for assets) for certain firms in some years. These observations were pre-screened 
and removed from the dataset by list-wise deletion (i.e., the whole observation is 
removed if there is any missing value) to perform the analysis.
Summary
A research design with a proposed model between firm-wise financial factors and 
firm performance was presented with detailed information on statistical analysis 
techniques and related assumptions, as well as data collection, and variable selections. 
The results will be shown and discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
The first section of this chapter checks the underlying assumptions of statistical 
analysis. The second section summarizes the descriptive statistics of all variables used in 
this study, along with bivariate correlation matrixes. The outcomes of relevant data 
analysis are presented in Section Three, including relevant tests and panel regression 
analyses for the two hospitality sectors. Hypotheses testing and summary are provided at 
the end of the chapter. STATA 9.0 is employed to perform all analyses.
Assumptions Checking 
Autocorrelation of each panel data model was tested by Wooldridge (2002) Wald test 
and the results are listed in Table 4. In the restaurant sector, the autocorrelation problem 
was raised for the Proxy Q from the perspective of unit effects (i.e., firm differences). 
Likewise, the Proxy Q and S-Ratio in the hotel sector also had such autocorrelation 
problems under unit effects. Autoregressive models with 1 lag period - AR (1) were used 
to mitigate these problems.
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Table 4 .
Wooldridge Wald Test fo r  Autocorrelation
Sector DV Effects Test Results Decision
Unit F(i,52rl5.405** AR(l)
Proxy Q
Time F(i,4)=0.307 No concern
Unit F(i,52)=0.007 No concern
n * * S-Ratio Restaurant Time F(i.4)=1.370 No concern
Unit F(i,52)=0.412 No concern
T-Ratio
Time F(i,4)=2.541 No concern
Unit F(i^)=6.072** AR(1)
Proxy Q
Time F(i,4r0.962 No concern
Unit F(,.29)=4.751** AR(l)
TT I S-Ratio Hotel Time F(i.4)=2.653 No concern
Unit F(i,29)“ L087 No concern
T-Ratio
Time F(,,4)=1.121 No concern
Note. ** represents the 0.05 significance level.
Residual scatterplots of predicted scores of the dependent variable and errors of 
prediction of OLS regressions were employed to check the assumptions of normality, 
linearity, and homoscadesticity for all the equations in both the restaurant and hotel sector 
as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). Six OLS equations were initially run for 
the three performance measures in both sectors. Additionally, three AR(1) OLS models 
were performed to control for the potential autocorrelation problems identified previously
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in the Proxy Q in both the restaurant and hotel sector and the Sharpe ratio in the hotel 
sector (see Table 4). A total of nine graphs (Figures 3-11) are generated for checking the 
assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. There are no serious issues for 
the assumptions of normality and linearity as all graphs are scattered without curve 
shapes. However, Figure 3 (Proxy Q for Restaurant Firms) and Figure 6 (Proxy Q for 
Hotel Firms) raise some concerns over heteroscadesticity because the distributions of the 
scatterplots are not random according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, using robust standard errors (robust model) can mitigate the heteroscadesticity 
problem for the fixed effects model. On the other hand, it will not be a problem for the 
random effects model in this matter as the random effects model does not require such an 
assumption. In addition, multicollinearity of these models was assessed through variance 
inflation factor (VIF). The values of VIF range from 1.060-2.634 for restaurant firms and 
1.129-1.854 for hotel firms, which implies no problems in this regard.
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Figure 4. Residual scatterplot of S-Ratio for restaurant firms.
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Figure 5. Residual scatterplot of T-Ratio for restaurant firms.
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Figure 6. Residual scatterplot of proxy Q for hotel firms.
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Figure 8. Residual scatterplot of T-Ratio for hotel firms.
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Figure 9. Residual scatterplot of proxy Q AR (1) for restaurant firms.
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Figure 10. Residual scatterplot of proxy Q AR (1) for hotel firms.
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Figure 11. Residual scatterplot o f S-Ratio AR (1) for hotel firms.
Descriptive Statistics 
The Restaurant Sector 
Observations of ninety-two restaurant firms were first obtained by their NAICS codes 
(i.e., 722110 and 722211) from 2000 through 2004. Firms with erroneous and inadequate 
data and lack of stock return information were dropped. A total of 256 observations 
(firm/year) from 56 restaurant firms with no missing values were retained for the data 
analysis in this study. Descriptive statistics of all continuous variables are summarized in 
Table 5. Table 6 shows the frequency and percentages of the dichotomous variables.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics fo r  the Restaurant Sector
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
Liquidity 256 0.923 0.543 3.597 0.234
Solvency 256 0.213 0.153 0.711 0.000
Activity 256 1.690 0.531 3.835 0.663
Growth 256 0.118 0.150 1.103 -0.259
Profitability 256 0.032 0.058 0.139 -0.417
Size 256 19.243 1.723 24.050 15.134
Proxy Q 256 1.816 1.070 7.573 0.470
S-Ratio 256 1.990 3.515 11.369 -10.705
T-Ratio 256 0.535 9.977 8.527 -6.957
Table 6
Frequency and Percentages o f  the Dichotomous Variables o f  the Restaurant Sector
Variable Frequency (Observations) Percentage
Dividend Payout 60 0.234
Business Diversification 57 0.223
Geographical Diversification 36 0.141
Liquidity (current ratio) ranged from 0.234 to 3.597, with a mean of 0.922. On 
average, restaurant firms had slightly more current liabilities than current assets. With an
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average value of solvency (debt ratio) at 0.213, the restaurant sector was considered a 
lower leveraged business in general. Restaurant firms relied more on equity and less on 
debt. The minimum activity ratio (total asset turnover) was 0.663 and the maximum was 
3.835. The average activity ratio of 1.690 showed that restaurant firms’ generated 
approximated 70 percent more sales than assets, indicating their reasonable management 
effectiveness and efficiency. Restaurant firms grew at 11.8 percent annually from 2000 to 
2004 in terms of sales, which was fairly strong. Profitability was 3.2 percent yearly. The 
Proxy Q fell between 0.470 and 7.573 with an average of 1.816. This implies that 
restaurant firms were approximately worth more than the cost to rebuild them. The mean 
of the Sharpe ratio and the Treynor ratio was 1.990 and 0.535, respectively. There were 
relative small percentages of restaurant firms that paid out dividend, implemented 
significant business diversification and/or geographical diversification.
The Hotel Sector
Fifty-two hotel (including casino hotel) firms were initially identified through their 
NACIS code numbers (i.e., 721110 and 721120). 151 observations (firm/year) from 32 
hotels panel data were retained in this study between 2000 and 2004 after incomplete 
and inaccurate accounting data and incomplete stock returns information were excluded 
The descriptive statistics of all continuous variables are presented in Table 7. Table 8 
shows the frequencies and percentages of the dichotomous variables.
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Table 7
Descriptive Statistics fo r  the Hotel Sector
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
Liquidity 151 1.205 0.925 5.995 0.253
Solvency 151 0.466 0.185 0.950 0.102
Activity 151 0.591 0.558 4.734 0.087
Growth 151 0.056 0.252 1.317 -0.783
Profitability 151 0.003 0.167 0.300 -1.000
Size 151 20.843 1.608 23.261 17.618
Proxy Q 151 1.194 0.517 3.670 0.514
S-Ratio 151 2.341 4.203 21.896 -7.472
T-Ratio 151 0.282 1.405 5.908 -7.796
Table 8
Frequency and Percentages o f  the Dichotomous Variables o f  the Hotel Sector
Variable Frequency (Observations) Percentage
Dividend Payout 48 0.318
Business Diversification 77 0.510
Geographical Diversification 44 0.291
The hotel sector had an average liquidity (current ratio) value of 1.205, with a 
maximum of 5.995 and a minimum of 0.253. Hotel firms had relative more current assets
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than current liabilities. The hotel sector was slightly more liquid than the restaurant 
counterpart. The mean value of solvency for hotel firms was 0.466, indicating hotels were 
approximately equally financed through both equity and debt. The hotel sector was 
leveraged relatively heavily compared to the restaurant sector. The activity ratio of hotel 
firms averaged at 0.591 and lagged far behind restaurant firms, reflecting mediocre 
management effectiveness and efficiency in using available assets to generate adequate 
revenues. The growth rate of hotel firms was 5.6 percent annually, which was moderate. 
Hotel firms had an extremely low annualized return of 0.3 percent during the 5-year 
period as compared with restaurant firms’ 3.2 percent annual profitability rate. The Proxy 
Q ranged from 0.514 to 3.670 with an average of 1.194. Hotels firms were worth slightly 
more than their rebuilt costs on average. The mean of the Sharpe ratio and Treynor ratio 
was 2.341 and 0.282, respectively. 31.8 % of hotel firm/year observations had dividend 
payouts. Half of the hotels had significant business diversifications and approximately 
30% of hotel firms had geographical diversifications. Hotels had more dividend payouts, 
business and geographical diversifications than restaurants from 2000 through 2004.
Correlation Matrix
Table 9 contains the correlation matrix of the variables for the restaurant sector. The 
correlation coefficients indicated low to moderate pair-wise correlation among these 
variables. The correlation matrix of the variables for the hotel sector is presented in Table 
10. No numbers arouse attention because bivariate correlation coefficients range from - 
0.338 to 0.532, which indicate low to moderate correlations among these variables.
74
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CD
" O
O
Q .
C
g
Q .
" O
CD
C/)(D
o'3
O
8
5
CQ-3"
i
3
CD
3.
3"
CD
CD
" O
O
Q .
C
aO
3
"O
O
CD
Q .
"O
CD
(/)C/)
LA
Taè/e P
Correlation Matrix o f  the Variables fo r  the Restaurant Sector
L S A G P Size D BD GD Proxy Q S-Ratio T-Ratio
L 1.000
S -0.381** 1.000
A -0.118** -0.077 1.000
G 0.223** -0.166** 0.081* 1.000
P -0.101* -0.110** -0.169** 0.157** 1.000
Size -0.220** 0.066 -0.392** -0.035 0.442** 1.000
D -0.127** -0.079 -0.247** -0.065 0.254** 0.505** 1.000
BD 0.034 0.074 0.064 -0.006 -0.031 0.076 0.103** 1.000
GD -0.004 0.122** 0.007 -0.039 0.163** 0.504** 0.174** 0.162** 1.000
Proxy Q 0.210** -0.372** 0.013 0.319** 0.332** 0.329** 0.018 0.171** 0.219** 1.000
S-Ratio 0.085* -0.155** -0.027 0.091* 0.201** 0.094* 0.061 -0.018 0.023 0.364** 1.000
T-Ratio 0.102* -0.074 -0.090* 0.040 0.111** 0.022 0.000 0.024 0.023 0.215** 0.510** 1.000
Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L: liquidity, S: solvency. A: activity, G: growth, 
P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification.
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Correlation Matrix o f  the Variables fo r  the Hotel Sector
L S A G P Size D BD GD Proxy Q S-Ratio T-Ratio
L 1.000
S -0.306** 1.000
A -0.110* -0.063 1.000
G -0.005 0.023 0.198** 1.000
P 0.183** -0.103 0.095 0.219** 1.000
Size -0.166** 0.045 -0.206** 0.074 0.014 1.000
D 0.152** -0.141** -0.090 -0.078 0.149** 0.345** 1.000
BD 0.131* -0.338** 0.028 -0.109* -0.215** -0.039 0.385** 1.000
GD 0.100 -0.230** 0.204** -0.041 0.042 0.099 0.532** 0.512** 1.000
Proxy Q 0.426** -0.191** 0.088 0.163** 0.371** 0.102 0.345** -0.079 0.155** 1.000
S-Ratio 0.037 -0.034 -0.068 0.131* 0.185** 0.156** 0.158** -0.251** -0.096 0.385** 1.000
T-Ratio 0.063 -0.036 0.160** 0.160** 0.203** 0.000 -0.032 -0.148** -0.035 0.171** 0.455** 1.000
Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L; liquidity, S: solvency. A: activity, G: growth, 
P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification
Panel Regression Results 
Results of the pooled OLS regression, as well as the fixed effects and random effects 
models for both the restaurant and hotel sectors are presented in this section. Firm 
performance is measured separately by three performance measures. The panel regression 
equations are viewed from two perspectives (i.e., unit effects and time effects)
The Restaurant Sector
Proxy Q
Table 11 summarizes the results of the relationships under different perspectives 
between firm-wise financial factors and firm performance measured by the Proxy Q 
within the time span from 2000 to 2004 in the restaurant sector. Under the conditions that 
there were no spatial or temporal differences among all restaurant observations 
(firm/year), the OLS model showed significant findings. Liquidity, activity ratio, sales 
growth, profitability demonstrated significant and positive relations with firm 
performance. In other words, higher percentages of liquidity, activity ratio, sales growth 
and profitability helped restaurant firms gain better value. Solvency, in converse, had a 
significantly negative effect on restaurant firm performance. Borrowing more debt may 
destroy restaurant firm value from 2000 to 2004. The controlling variable size was found 
to be a significant positive contributor to restaurant performance. Larger restaurants 
performed better. The negative sign of the dichotomous dividend variable indicated that 
restaurants without paying dividends outperformed those distributing dividends during 
this period. On the other hand, restaurants with more business segments had better 
performance compared to those with only restaurant business. There was no statistically 
significant difference in restaurant firm performance with respect to the geographical
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diversification strategy. Whether the restaurant firm generated significant foreign sales or 
not had few impacts on its performance. Although the results of the pooled OLS model 
showed a good model fit with an R-square of 0.451, the underlying assumption that all 
restaurants in each year were homogeneous could be too stringent. Therefore, further 
analyses following the steps described in Chapter 3 resumed (see Figure 2).
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Table 11
Results o f Regression with Proxy Q as the Dependent Variable fo r  the Restaurant Sector
OLS RE (ARl) 
Unit Effects
FE (ARl) 
Unit Effects
RE
Time Effects
FE (Robust) 
Time Effects
L 0.274** 0.178* 0.178 0.274** 0.256**
(2.38) (1.95) (1.54) (2.38) (2.23)
S -2.262** -2.077** -2.273** -2.262** -2.238**
(-5.92) (-4.78) (-3.10) (-5.92) (-5.90)
A 0.257** 0.353** 0.606* 0.257** 0.238**
(2.22) (2.30) (1.69) (2.22) (2.06)
G 1.444** 0.599** 0.317 1.444** 1.405**
(4.04) (2.17) (0.68) (4.04) (3.90)
P 2.890** 0.544 -0.055 2.890** 3.124**
(2.86) (0.75) (-0.07) (2.86) (3.10)
Size 0.292** 0.265** -0.109 0.292** 0.279**
(6.13) (4.02) (-0.36) (6.13) (5.84)
D -0.615** -0.217 0.115 -0.615** -0.619**
(-4.34) (-1.43) (0.46) (-4.34) G4 38)
BD 0.447** 0.301* -0.447 0.447** 0.463**
(L 5 0 (1.65) (-0.80) (3.58) (3.73)
GD 0.055 0.103 -0.320 0.055 0.073
(0.30) (0.38) (-0.51) (0.30) (0.40)
Constant -4.228** -3.680** 3.372 -4.228** -3.940**
(-4.07) (-2.66) (0.82) (-4.07) (-.379)
R"(Adj-R^) 0.451 (0.431) 0.402 0.902 (0.854) 0.451 0.468 (0.440)
Overall
Significance F p .  2 4 0 = 2 2 .4 8 * * Chf(,o)=74.05** F(9,135)=3.17** Chf(9)=202.29** F(9,242)=22.18**
Statistics
Hausman
Test Chi^ (6)=17.72** Chi^Q'=3.55
B-P LM Test Chf(i)= 159.79** Chf(i)=0.70
Incremental
F Test F(55..35)=5.51** F(4,242)=1.91
Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L: liquidity, 
S: solvency. A: activity, G: growth, P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend 
payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification.
The perspective of unit effects (i.e., fimi differences) model stated that each 
restaurant firm had different characteristics, such as personnel, corporate culture.
79
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
location, and available resources. Those variables were either omitted or unobservable. 
The variations in each year were assumed to be invariant. AR (1) models were performed 
due to the autocorrelation problem identified by the Wooldridge Wald test in Table 4.
The significant result of the Hausman specification test and the incremental F test implied 
that the fixed effects model would be more appropriate than both the random effects and 
OLS model (see Table 11). The results of the fixed effects model with AR (1) term 
indicated that two independent variables were significant determinants for restaurant 
performance. Solvency had an inverse relationship with firm performance. Less debt 
could evidently enhance restaurant firm value. The positive association between activity 
ratio and performance reflected that higher management effectiveness and efficiency did 
increase restaurant firm performance. All other firm-specific financial factors had 
inconclusive effects on restaurant firm performance in this model. The R-squared value 
changed to 0.902 after including the firm difference effects.
Taking into consideration of time effects instead of unit effects, the model was 
reevaluated without autoregressive term due to the insignificant Wooldridge Wald test in 
Table 4. The time effects model considered that each year had a significant and different 
dynamic owing to the changes of taste, technology, economy, business cycle and so forth. 
The differences between firms, however, were considered homogenous. The fixed effects 
model was run by a robust model using the robust standard error as the assumption of 
homoscedasticity was violated, which was detected by Figure 3. The result of the 
Hausman test indicated the random effects model would be more appropriate while the 
Breusch and Pagan LM test suggested the OLS model would be as efficient as the 
random effects model. Hence, the results under the perspective of time effects were same
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as those of the OLS model. Interpretations of the time effects model were the same with 
those of the OLS model (see Table 11).
Sharpe Ratio
Table 12 provides the results of the relationships of different models between firm- 
wise financial factors and restaurant firm performance measured by the Sharpe ratio from 
2000 to 2004. The OLS model considered there were no significant differences both 
across firms and over time. The R-square value was just 0.065. The profitability ratio was 
the only significant determinant on the Sharpe ratio after reviewing the results in Table 
12. All other independent variables failed to produce statistically significant impacts on 
restaurant firm performance after the total risk was taken into account.
81
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 12
Results o f  Regression with Sharpe Ratio as the Dependent Variable for the Restaurant
Sector
OLS RE FE RE FE
Unit Effects Unit Effects Time Effects Time Effects
L 0.487 0.487 0.345 0.487 0.523
(0.99) (0.99) (0.43) (0.99) (1.13)
S -2.315 -2.315 -11.613** -2.315 -1.834
(-1.41) (-1.41) (-2.68) (-1.41) (-1.20)
A 0.181 0.181 1.147 0.181 0.181
(0.36) (0.36) (0.66) (0.36) (0.39)
G 0.703 0.703 0.446 0.703 0.746
(0.46) (0.46) (0.19) (0.46) (0.52)
P 10.476** 10.476** 8.148 10.476** 11.262**
(2.42) (2.42) (1.25) (2.42) (2.78)
Size 0.133 0.133 -0.252 0.133 0.091
(0.65) (0.65) (-0.20) (0.65) (0.47)
D -0.003 -0.003 -1.013 -0.003 0.134
(0.00) (0.00) (-0.67) (0.00) (0.24)
BD -0.089 -0.089 0.995 -0.089 -0.064
(-0.17) (-0.17) (0.43) (-0.17) (-0.13)
GD -0.226 -0.226 2.179 -0.226 -0.175
(-0.29) (-0.29) (0.61) (-0.29) (-0.24)
Constant -1.194 -1.194 6.462 -1.194 -0.592
(-0.27) (-0.27) (0.26) (-0.27) (-0.14)
R"(Adj-R^) 0.065 (0.030) 0.065 0.232 (-0.026) 0.065 0.206 (0.164)
Overall
Significance F(9,246)=1.89* Chi^(9fl6.97** F(9,191)=1.70* ChiV)=16.97** F(9.242)=2.14**
Statistics
Hausman
Test Chi"(6],=6.96 Chi'(«):=0.85
B-P LM Test ChF(,)=4.81** ChF(,)=126.01**
Incremental
F Test F(55,190=0.76 F(4.242)=10.82**
Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L: liquidity, 
S: solvency. A: activity, G: growth, P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend 
payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification.
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The Hausman test implied the random effects models were more appropriate from the 
perspective of either unit effects or time effects. The Breusch and Pagan LM tests 
suggested the random effects models were better than the OLS model under both effects 
as well. In fact, the OLS model and these two random effects models under either unit or 
time effects had the same coefficient values and the significance levels. Such facts may 
suggest that the unit effects and time effects for the restaurant sector, if  any, are minimal 
and can be omitted when the firm performance was measured by the Sharpe ratio. Hence, 
the results had same explanations as those of the OLS model for restaurant firms (see 
Table 12).
Treynor Ratio
Surprisingly enough, results of the relationships between firm-wise financial factors 
and firm performance measured by the Treynor ratio were overall insignificant for all 
appropriate models (see Table 13). It should be noted that some individual factors had 
significant impacts on firm performance. However, their effects should not be considered 
as the whole models were statistically insignificant. The possible reasons could be many, 
such as the impacts of unsystematic risk in each firm, the validity of CAPM model, the 
reliability and accuracy of measuring beta, and the model fit. These problems may 
require further investigations.
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Table 13
Results o f Regression with Treynor Ratio as the Dependent Variable fo r  the Restaurant
Sector
OLS RE FE RE FE
Unit Effects Unit Effects Time Effects Time Effects
L 0.216 0.236 0.634 0.216 0.267
(0.83) (0.88) (1.60) (0.83) (1.04)
S -0.582 -0.598 -0.263 -0.582 -0.491
(-0.67) (-0.65) (-0.12) (-0.67) (-0.58)
A -0.347 -0.306 0.974 -0.347 -0.367
(-1.32) (-1.09) (1.14) (-1.32) (-1.41)
G 0.045 -0.039 -1.004 0.045 -0.183
(0.06) (-0.05) (-0.85) (0.06) (-0.23)
P 3.935* 4.003* 3.791 3.935* 3.647
(1.72) (1.72) (1.18) (1.72) (1.61)
Size -0.067 -0.069 -1.224* -0.067 -0.059
(-0.62) (-0.60) (-2.00) (-0.62) (-0.55)
D -0.132 -0.122 0.135 -0.132 -0.163
(-0.41) (-0.36) (0.18) (-0.41) (-0.52)
BD 0.161 0.170 2.835* 0.161 0.183
(0.57) (0.56) (2.48) (0.57) (0.66)
GD 0.216 0.210 0.472 0.216 0.225
(0.52) (0.47) (0.27) (0.52) (0.55)
Constant 2.175 2.125 21.193* 2.175 2.017
(0.92) (0.85) (1 7 0 (0.92) (0.86)
R\Adj.R") .0.034 (-0.002) 0.034 0.309 (0.077) 0.034 0.084 (0.035)
Overall
Significance F(9.246)=0.95 ChF(9)=7.58 F(9,i91)=1.78* Chi^(9)=8.57 F(9,242)= 1.01
Statistics
Hausman
Test Chi'■{6)=8.17 C h iV =93.41**
B-P LM Test ChF(,)=0.44 ChP(,)=7.19**
Incremental
F Test F(55,191)=1.38 F(4.242)=3.31**
Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L: liquidity, 
S: solvency. A: activity, G: growth, P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend 
payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification.
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The Hotel Sector
Proxy Q
The outcomes of the relationships of different models between firm-wise financial 
factors and firm performance measured by the Proxy Q fi-om 2000 to 2004 in the hotel 
sector are shown in Table 14. The OLS model assumed that firm and time differences 
among all hotel observations (firm/year) were the same. The R-squared value of the OLS 
model was 0.410. Liquidity, activity ratio, and profitability presented significant and 
positive relations with firm performance. Put it in another way, higher percentages of 
liquidity, activity ratio and profitability could contribute to better hotel firm performance. 
Dividend variable had a significant and positive coefficient, suggesting that it was better 
for hotels to distribute their dividend to enhance firm value. In contrast to the findings in 
the restaurant sector, business diversification would significantly give rise to weak hotel 
performance. All other firm-specific financial factors, such as solvency, sales growth and 
so on did not generate significant results. It is necessary to continue further analyses with 
unit effects and time effects models to go beyond the OLS model assumptions.
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Table 14
Results o f  Regression with Proxy Q as the Dependent Variable for the Hotel Sector
OLS RE(AR1) 
Unit Effects
FE(ARl) 
Unit Effects
RE
Time Effects
FE (Robust) 
Time Effects
L 0.210** 0.092** 0.020 0.210** 0.202**
(5.20) (2.06) (0.36) (5.20) (5.15)
S -0.261 -0.479* -1.396** -0.261 -0.176
(-1.28) (-1.72) (-2.24) (-1.28) (-0.88)
A 0.128* 0.051 -0.105 0.128* .125*
(1.91) (0.64) (-0.78) (1.91) (1.91)
G 0.212 0.162 0.234* 0.212 0.217
(1.50) (1.45) (1.76) (1.50) (1.52)
P 0.460** 0.173 -0.130 0.460** 0.510**
(2.03) (0.84) (-0.57) (2.03) (2.30)
Size 0.018 0.010 0.862** 0.018 0.020
(0.75) (0.28) (3.30) (0.75) (0.86)
D 0.386** 0.305** 0.041 0.386** 0.330**
(3.96) (2.85) (0.31) (3.96) (3.42)
BD -0.264** -0.236** -0.216 -0.264** -0.219**
(-2.99) frL9% (-0.93) (-2.99) G253)
GD 0.006 0.059 -0.720 0.006 0.012
(0.06) (0.40) (-1.22) (0.06) (0.13)
Constant 0.607 1.067 -15.919** 0.607 0.529
(1.12) (1.30) (-4.88) (1.12) (1.01)
R^(Adj-R") 0.410(0.372) 0.373 0.773 (0.656) 0.410 0.461 (0.410)
Overall
Significance
Statistics
F(9,,41)=10.87** ChP(,o)=31.90** F(9,7,)=2.62** Chi"(9)=97.86** F(9,137)=9.84**
Hausman
Test
B-P LM Test
Incremental 
F Test
C h iV
Chi\i)=25.94**
=57.95**
Fp,,79)=2.29**
Chi(6)
ChP(i)=6.31**
=4.36
F(4,,37)=3.27**
Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L: liquidity, 
S: solvency. A: activity, G; growth, P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend 
payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification.
Under the perspective o f unit effects that there were differences in each firm and no 
difference over time, the model was rerun. The fixed effects model was favored over the
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random effects model according to the significant Hausman test. The significant 
incremental F test suggested the fixed effects model was better than the OLS model. The 
results of the fixed effects model after controlling for the autocorrelation effect-AR (1)- 
suggested two independent variables (solvency and sales growth) and the control variable 
size had significant impacts on hotel performance. Solvency produced negative effects on 
firm performance. Borrowing more debt took its toll on hotel firm value. The 
significantly positive association between sales growth and performance showed that 
sales growth in the hotel could improve its firm value. Larger hotel firms in terms of total 
assets performed better than their smaller counterparts. The remaining firm-specific 
financial factors were found to have non-significant effects on hotel firm performance in 
this model. The value of R-squared increased to 0.773 when the effects of firm 
differences were incorporated.
Both the fixed effects model and random effects models with the perspective of time 
effects were performed. The robust standard error was used in the fixed effects model as 
the problem of heteroscedasticity was found in Figure 6. The insignificant Hausman test 
under time effects indicated the random effects model was favored over the fixed effect 
model while the significant Breusch and Pagan LM tests confirmed the random effects 
model was better for the hotel sector as compared with the OLS model. The results of the 
random effects model under time effects were the same as those of the OLS model (see 
Table 14), so were the interpretations of the results.
Sharpe Ratio
Table 15 contains results of the relationships of various models between firm-wise 
financial factors and firm performance measured by the Sharpe ratio from 2000 to 2004
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in the hotel sector. With the assumption of homogeneity both across firms and over time, 
the results of the OLS model showed that only dividend policy and business 
diversification variables made significant differences on the total risk-adjusted hotel firm 
performance. The R-squared value was 0.180. In particular, hotels which paid out 
dividends over the 5-year period were perceived to be better than hotels which did not 
pay dividends. Alternatively, more business diversifications were considered as a bad 
strategy on hotel firm performance when the total risk was adjusted. The rest of firm-wise 
financial factors were statistically insignificant to hotel firm performance after controlling 
the total risk.
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Table 15
Results o f Regression with Sharpe Ratio as the Dependent Variable for the Hotel Sector
OLS RE(AR1) 
Unit Effects
FE(AR1) 
Unit Effects
RE
Time Effects
FE
Time Effects
L 0.003 0.190 0.503 0.003 -0.081
(0.01) (0.43) (0.64) (0.01) (-0.25)
S -3.014 -2.910 -8.888 -3.014 -1.076
(-1.54) (-1.22) (-1.05) (-1.54) (-0.66)
A -0.241 -0.159 -0.417 -0.241 -0.311
(-0.38) (-0.22) (-0.21) (-0.38) (-0.59)
G 1.902 1.844 4.637** 1.902 1.957*
(1.41) (1.39) (2.36) (1.41) (1.68)
P 0.850 2.251 3.051 0.850 1.614
(0.39) (0.98) (0.92) (0.39) (0.89)
Size 0.091 0.164 5.436 0.091 0.131
(0.40) (0.56) (1.56) (0.40) (0.69)
D 2.884** 2.656** 0.899 2.884** 1.881**
(3.09) (2.48) (0.48) (3.09) (2.39)
BD -2.817** -2.826** -3.147 -2.817** -1.932**
(-3.33) (-2.76) (-0.98) G3.33) (-2.74)
GD -1.100 -0.970 4.130 -1.100 -1.050
(-1.16) (-0.82) (0.86) (-1.16) (-1.34)
Constant 2.707 0.982 -105.097** 2.707 0.976
(0.52) (0.15) (-2.04) (0.52) (0.23)
R"(Adj-R') 0.180(0.127) 0.175 0.369 (0.046) 0.180 0.460 (0.409)
Overall
Significance
Statistics
F(9, i41)=3.43** ChP(io)=25.38** F(,.7,)=2.19** ChP(9)=30.90** F(9.,37)=3.22**
Hausman
Test
B-P LM Test
Incremental 
F Test
Chi"(6)=
ChF(i)=6.18**
12.76**
F(31.79)=0.42
Chi"(Q:
ChP(,)=205.30**
=3.26
F(4.137)=17.81**
Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L; liquidity, 
S: solvency. A: activity, G: growth, P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend 
payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification.
The significant Hausman test implied the fixed effects model was more appropriate 
than the random effects model from the perspective of unit effects (see Table 15). The
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significant incremental F test showed the fixed effects model was better than the OLS 
model. The results of the fixed effects model with AR (1) suggested only sales growth 
would make significant positive impacts on total risk-adjusted hotel firm performance 
with an R-squared of 0.369. Hotels with positive sales growth exhibited healthy firm 
performance on a total risk-adjusted basis.
The result of the Hausman test under time effects indicated the random effects model 
was preferred (see Table 15). Although the significant Breusch and Pagan LM test 
implied that the random effects model was favored over the OLS, the random effects 
model had the same results as the OLS model. Thus, same interpretations with the OLS 
model followed for hotel firms when the total risk was considered.
Treynor Ratio
Similar to the results in the restaurant sector, none of the appropriate models had an 
overall significant test statistic as shown in Table 16. Therefore, no further discussions 
would follow.
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Table 16
Results o f  Regression with Treynor Ratio as the Dependent Variable for the Hotel Sector
OLS RE FE RE FE
Unit Effeets Unit Effects Time Effects Time Effects
L 0.103 0.103 0.145 0.103 0.111
(0.76) (0.76) (0.59) (0.76) (0.83)
S -0.336 -0.336 -2.137 -0.336 0.035
(-0.49) (-0.49) (-1.10) (-0.49) (0.05)
A 0.379* 0.379* 0.768 0.379* 0.387*
(1.67) (1.67) (1.43) (1.67) (1.76)
G 0.485 0.485 0.535 0.485 0.541
(1.02) (1.02) (0.99) (1.02) (1.12)
P 1.059 1.059 1.891* 1.059 1.189
(1.39) (1.39) (1.77) (1.39) (1.58)
Size 0.029 0.029 -0.127 0.029 0.038
(0.35) (0.35) (-0.15) (0.35) (0.48)
D 0.007 0.007 -0.052 0.007 -0.143
(0.02) (0.02) (-0.09) (0.02) (-0.44)
BD -0.354 -0.354 -0.049 -0.354 -0.216
(-1.19) (-1.19) (-0.06) (-1.19) (-0.74)
GD -0.073 -0.073 0.639 -0.073 -0.082
(-0.22) (-0.22) (0.38) (-0.22) (-0.25)
Constant -0.342 -0.342 3.307 -0.342 -0.735
(-0.19) (-0.19) (0.19) (-0.19) (-0.41)
R"(Adj-R") 0.089 (0.031) 0.089 0.233 (-0.036) 0.089 0.167 (0.088)
Overall
Significance F(9,i4i)-1 53 Chi^(9)=13.75 F(9, 111)= 1.67 Chf(9)=13.75 F(9. 137)= 1.58
Statistics
Hausman
Test Chi^ (6)==5.31 Chi"(Q=4.55
B-P LM Test Chf(i)=2.81 Chf(i)=5.57**
Incremental
F Test F(3i,iii)=0.67 F(4. 137)=3.20**
Note. ** and * represents the 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. L: liquidity, 
S: solvency. A: activity, G: growth, P: profitability. Size: log of total assets, D: dividend 
payout, BD: business diversification, GD: geographical diversification.
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Regression Results Summary 
In the restaurant sector, solvency and activity ratio were the only significant factors to 
the value-based firm performance when only firm differences were considered. When 
only time effects model was taken into account, liquidity, sales growth, profitability, size, 
dividend payout, and business diversification constructs were all significant determinants 
of the Proxy Q besides previously identified solvency and activity factors. Alternatively, 
profitability appeared to be the only significant contributor to the Sharpe ratio of 
restaurant firms in all different models. For the hotel sector, solvency, sales growth and 
size significantly affected hotel firm performance measured by the Proxy Q when only 
differences among firms (i.e., unit effects) were considered. From time effects’ 
perspective, liquidity, activity ratio, profitability and business diversification played 
important roles in influencing the Proxy Q. On the other hand, only sales growth had a 
significant impact on hotel firm’s Sharpe ratio when merely firm heterogeneity was 
considered. Dividend and business diversification had significantly differentiated hotel 
firm’s total risk-adjusted performance in the time effects model. No significant results 
were yielded for systematic risk-based firm performance measured by the Treynor ratio 
in both the hotel and restaurant sectors. It should be pointed out that all the random 
effects models under the perspective of time effects have the exact same results as the 
OLS models. With only a 5-year period, the effects of time dynamics were confirmed to 
be minimal. The empirical results verify the reason why most literature in panel data 
regression has only taken into account of unit effects models.
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Hypotheses Testing
This section presents the results of the six hypotheses constructed in Chapter 3.
Hypothesis I posits that the examined firm-wise financial factors will have impacts on 
firm performance in terms of value-based return in the restaurant sector. This hypothesis 
is statistically supported at the 0.05 significance level that at least one financial factor 
significantly affects firm performance, which is measured by the Proxy Q.
Hypothesis II posits that the examined firm-wise financial factors will have impacts 
on firm performance in terms of total risk-adjusted return in the restaurant sector. This 
hypothesis is statistically supported at the 0.05 significance level that at least one 
financial factor significantly affects firm performance as the Sharpe ratio surrogates firm 
performance.
Hypothesis III posits that the examined firm-wise financial factors will have impacts 
on firm performance in terms of systematic risk-adjusted return in the restaurant sector. 
This hypothesis is not supported when firm performance is evaluated by the Treynor 
ratio.
Hypothesis IV postulates that the examined firm-wise financial factors will have 
impacts on firm performance in terms of value-based return in the hotel sector. This 
hypothesis is statistically supported at the 0.05 significance level that at least one 
financial factor significantly affects firm performance, which is measured by the Proxy
Q.
Hypothesis V postulates that the examined firm-wise financial factors will have 
impacts on firm performance in terms of total risk-adjusted return in the hotel sector. This 
hypothesis is statistically supported at the 0.05 significance level that at least one
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financial factor significantly affects firm performance as the Sharpe ratio surrogates firm 
performance.
Hypothesis VI postulates the examined firm-wise financial factors will have impacts 
on firm performance in terms of systematic risk-adjusted return in the hotel sector. This 
hypothesis is not supported when firm performance is evaluated by the Treynor ratio.
Summary
Panel regression analysis and results were presented in this chapter. The underlying 
assumptions were checked first. Summaries of descriptive statistics and correlation tables 
were then reported. Following the test procedures, relevant data analysis were presented 
and discussed for both the restaurant and hotel sectors by three performance measures. 
Conclusions, summary and future research will be presented in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
The goal of financial management of any company is to establish the best possible 
financial policy (i.e., financing, investing and dividend decisions) to improve firm 
performance, the lifeblood of a company. There has been a proliferation of studies over 
the years in the realm of corporate finance to develop numerous theories in an effort to 
understand the relationships between firm-wise financial factors and firm performance. 
The reasons for this study to select firm-wise financial factors are several. First, financial 
factors, unlike corporate culture, location, and competition, are direct, objective and 
measurable. Second, firm-wise financial factors are those that can be controlled and 
influenced by hospitality manager’s decisions. Non-firm specific financial factors, such 
as the general economic conditions, the market trends, which are usually beyond the 
firm’s control, are not considered in this study. Third, previous studies did find individual 
financial factors’ impacts on firm performance, but not in a comprehensive way. This 
study is intended to investigate these factors in an integrated mode. Fourth, through the 
extensive review of the related literature, most firm-wise financial factors, such as 
liquidity, solvency, and growth, hold so-called optimal structures both theoretically and 
empirically (Moyer, McGuigan, & Kretlow, 2001). This optimal point is associated with 
best firm performance; any where below or above this point will undermine firm
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performance. A positive relationship holds between the specific financial factor and firm 
performance before the optimal point is reached. A negative relationship prevails after 
the target point is passed. Thus, it is the responsibility of the hospitality management 
team to craft the mix and percentages of many firm-specific financial factors to optimize 
firm performance. The inconclusive patterns of results exhibited by prior research on 
firm-wise financial factors and firm performance calls for an empirical investigation in 
the hospitality industry.
The objective of the study is to investigate the relationship between firm-wise 
financial factors and firm performance in the hospitality industry (i.e., the hotel and 
restaurant sector). A handful of potential firm-wise financial factors have appeared in the 
financial literature, which set up a foundation for the linear model tested in this study. In- 
depth interpretations and insightful implications of the findings will be also provided in 
this study. With a methodologically sound design, findings of this study from the 
analyses of these financial factors may shed light on how to improve firm performance 
for the hospitality managers. Additionally, the knowledge generated from this study will 
contribute to the body of the hospitality financial management knowledge.
This chapter first presents the summary of the study. Implications of the findings of 
study for the hospitality industry are discussed next in the hospitality industry. Lastly, 
this chapter provides some recommendations for future research.
Summary of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the impacts of firm-wise financial factors on 
firm performance in the restaurant and hotel sectors. Linear regression models with panel
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data were proposed with a consideration of both research questions and a review of 
related literature. Both the hotel and restaurant sectors were assessed by three different 
types of firm performance measure (Tobin’s Q, Sharpe ratio, and Treynor ratio) as each 
represented firm performance from different angles. Six hypotheses were constructed in 
this study accordingly. Nine different firm-wise financial factors ( liquidity, solvency, 
activity, growth, profitability, size, dividend policy, business diversification, and 
geographical diversification) were the independent variables in the regression.
Relevant hospitality firm data were derived from COMPUSTAT and CRSP according 
to their individual NACIS codes. The period of 2000-2004 was the time frame for this 
study given the availability of relevant firm data since the start of the new millennium. 
The sample of the restaurant sector and hotel sector have 256 and 151 firm/year 
observations, respectively, involving 56 restaurant firms and 32 hotel firms. With the data 
being both cross-sectional and time-series data in nature, panel regression technique was 
used for estimating models. The Hausman specification test, the incremental F test and 
the Breusch and Pagan LM test were used to identify the most appropriate model among 
the constant coefficient model (i.e., the pooled OLS model), the fixed effects model, and 
the random effects model. The results were obtained after several assumptions were 
checked.
The restaurant sector was relatively less liquid but highly solvent, with a moderate 
growth rate and profitability. Not many restaurant firms paid out dividends, nor did they 
have business and geographical diversifications. On the other hand, the hotel sector was 
relatively liquid but less solvent, with a lower growth rate and very poor profitability.
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Only about one third of the hotels (firm/year) paid out dividends. Many diversification 
activities, either business or geographical, occurred for hotel firms through 2000 to 2004. 
Solvency, activity ratio, liquidity, sales growth, profitability, size, dividend payout and 
business diversification may influence restaurants’ firm performance in terms of the 
Proxy Q whereas profitability was the only significant factor of restaurant firm 
performance measured by the Sharpe ratio. For the hotel companies, solvency, sales 
growth, size, liquidity, activity ratio, profitability and business diversification had 
significant impacts on the Proxy Q. However, only sales growth appeared to be highly 
related with the Sharpe ratio in hotels. No statistically significance was found between 
firm-wise financial factors and the systematic risk-adjusted firm performance (i.e., the 
Treynor ratio) for either the hotel or restaurant sector.
Implications of the Findings 
Implications of the results are discussed next from two different perspectives (unit 
effects and time effects) for both the restaurant and hotel sectors.
The Restaurant Sector
Proxy Q
From a unit effects’ perspective, solvency and activity ratio were found to be 
significant determinants of firm performance as measured by the Proxy Q during 2000- 
2004 (See Table 11). Activity ratio had a positive and significant effect on firm 
performance, which was supportive of both the theoretical foundation (Moyer et al.,
2001) and the empirical evidence (Roenfeldt & Cooley, 1978). Solvency was shown to be 
negatively related with restaurant firm performance. The negative sign of solvency
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indicated that costs of using debt in restaurant firms overweighed benefits of using debt, 
which supported the findings reported by John (1993) and Capon, Farley, and Hoenig 
(1990)’s studies. Debt structure of the restaurant sector was beyond the optimal level. 
Therefore, restaurants with relatively higher value of asset utilization and lower value of 
debt usage were more likely to achieve better firm performance compared to those with 
relatively lower asset turnover and higher debt percentages. Higher activity ratio indicates 
firm’s better efficiency and effectiveness, which exhibited positive relationship on 
restaurant firm performance. Using less debt was favored to yield better firm 
performance for restaurants.
In consideration of only time effects among firms, liquidity, sales growth, 
profitability, dividend payout, size, and business diversification significantly contributed 
to restaurant firm performance in addition to solvency and activity ratio during 2000 to 
2004 (see Table 11). Liquidity, activity, sales growth, profitability, size, business 
diversification variables had positive impacts on restaurant firm performance over these 5 
years. The empirical evidence was in line with the findings of many previous studies 
(Baskin, 1987; Capon et al, 1990; Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; Jacobson, 1987; 
Keating, 1997; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Myers, 1977; Roenfeldt & Cooley, 1978; Villalonga, 
2004). During these 5 years, the shortage costs of liquidity assets on average exceeded 
the holding costs of liquid assets in the restaurant sector. Restaurants were suggested to 
retain relative more liquid assets in order to prevent from the potential bankruptcy. 
Effectiveness and efficiency could help restaurants gain better performance. Larger 
restaurants with more assets, rapid sales growth rates and more business diversifications 
achieved good firm performance. Solvency and dividend payout, on the other hand.
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affected firm performance negatively. Relatively higher debt ratio and the act of paying 
dividend resulted in lower restaurant performance in a significant way. The financial 
costs and agency costs associated with more debt were greater than the tax benefits of the 
debt. Meanwhile, paying out dividend signaled the firm did not have confidence in and 
good expectations of its own projects. Therefore, a restaurant which wanted to improve 
its firm performance over time may consider increasing the values of financial factors 
which had positive relationships with firm performance and/or decreasing the values of 
the factors which were negatively related with firm performance.
Geographical diversification did not appear to have any significant influence on 
restaurant firm performance measured by the Proxy Q in any models from 2000-2004. 
The potential reason might be the scarcity of restaurant firms’ significant foreign 
presence, which could lead to an insignificant effect on firm performance.
Sharpe Ratio
Profitability showed to be significantly associated with restaurant firm performance 
as measured by the Sharpe ratio in all different models from 2000-2004. The higher 
profitability was, the better performance was. The rest of firm-wise financial factors did 
not have direct impacts on the Sharpe ratio in the restaurant sector. There were at least 
two potential reasons. Market usually consists of a large group of heterogeneous 
investors who may hold various opinions about the firm’s financial structures. Different 
financial structures are associated with different levels of risks. For instance, low debt 
ratio may be considered as a combination of both lower return and lower risk. When the 
total risk was adjusted, only high profitability was shown to be rewarded by the market 
for the restaurant sector in this study. Additionally, profitability might act as the
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middleman between these insignificant firm-specific financial factors and the total risk- 
adjusted performance measure. These insignificant firm-specific financial factors might 
significantly determine the value of profitability, which in turn, effectively affected the 
Sharpe ratio. Thus, market or investors perceived restaurant firm performance based only 
on firm’s profitability as evidenced by this study for whatever reasons. This finding 
confirmed that profitability was a good indicator of firm performance (Hoskisson et al., 
1994). An increase in profits could evidently improve restaurant total risk-adjusted firm 
performance.
Strategic Suggestions for the Restaurant Sector
Restaurants can implement certain financial strategies to improve their performance. 
Restaurant firms could finance their capital through issuing more common stocks and less 
debt to improve their performance as increased leverage (debt ratio) was significantly and 
negatively related to firm performance. Less debt was still preferred though the restaurant 
sector was in the relative low-debt category. Being a well-established and mature 
industry, it is very difficult for restaurants to achieve relatively higher returns. Thus, the 
key for restaurant management was to lower financial risk through a reduction of debt 
percentages to improve firm performance. Further, it proved to be both safer and better to 
keep debt at a fairly lower level in a much fluctuated economic conditions during 2000- 
2004 for the restaurant sector.
The positive relationship between liquidity and firm performance in this study 
suggests that an increase in liquidity value can also help a restaurant firm improve its 
performance by either decreasing its current obligations or increasing it current assets.
The average current ratio of the restaurant sector was .933, indicating it was a less liquid
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sector. During the economic fluctuation of these 5 years, holding relative more liquid 
assets could reduce potential bankruptcy costs in an unstable economic environment. 
While it is hard to adjust the left side of the balance sheet (i.e., the assets structure), 
restaurant managers can certainly either transform current liabilities to long-term debts or 
retire some portion of current liabilities by issuing more stocks to make the firms more 
liquid.
Growing restaurants into bigger and larger organizations and diversifying restaurant 
into more business segments with a reduction of dividend payout could be other means to 
improve firm performance due to the significant relationship between size, business 
diversification, sales growth, dividend policy and firm performance. Restaurants used to 
be considered small companies. Growing into larger firms can help them increase their 
visibility and publicity among the public as well as enhance their market dominance, 
share and bargaining power. This was particular true for restaurant firms to withstand the 
market fluctuations. Restaurants may sustain their growth by retaining more of their 
profits into retained earnings for their future development, sacrificing current dividend 
payout for their future rapid growths, and diversifying the business into related business 
segments, such as franchise operations and retailing businesses.
The positive relationships between profitability ratio, activity ratio and restaurant 
performance have confirmed the importance of the management effectiveness and 
efficiency. Both sales and profits are very important to the health of the restaurant sector. 
These two accounting measures can also be utilized to align management’s benefits with 
shareholder’s.
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The Hotel Sector
Proxy Q
Under the perspective o f unit effects, solvency, sales growth and size were deemed to 
significantly affect hotel firm performance as measured by the Proxy Q during 2000- 
2004. Solvency negatively affected firm performance, similar to what have been found in 
the restaurant sector. The costs of adding more debt outpaced the benefits of debts. Sales 
growth and size, on the other hand, showed significant and positive impacts on firm 
performance. These results were consistent with the previous studies (Capon et al, 1990; 
Child, 1972; John, 1993; Keating, 1997; Keats & Hitt, 1988). Compared to their peers in 
other industries, hotel companies with relatively higher values of sales growth and total 
assets and lower percentage of debt usage were more likely to achieve better firm 
performance. Higher sales growth and larger firm size reflected firm’s great outlook of 
future earnings and market dominance, which also improved hotel performance. Using 
less debt was once again confirmed to gain better firm performance for hotel firms. The 
remainder of firm-specific financial factors yielded non-significant impacts on hotel firm 
performance.
When only time differences were considered, liquidity, activity, profitability, and 
dividend variables appeared to greatly and positively influence hotel firm performance 
during 2000-2004. On the other hand, this study found more business diversifications 
might result in poor hotel performance. These findings were consistent with some 
previous studies (Baskin, 1987; Comment & Jarrell, 1994; Jacobson, 1987; Lang & Stulz, 
1994; Mooradian & Yang, 2001; Myers, 1977; Roenfeldt & Cooley, 1978; Varaiya & 
Kerin, 1987). Hotel firms could improve their performance over time by incrementing the
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values of liquidity, activity ratio, profitability, and dividend payout which had positive 
relationships with firm performance. Holding more current assets may enhance firm’s 
financial position to stay away from potential bankruptcy in the unstable economy 
(Moyer et al., 2001). Improvement on internal management as measured by the 
management effectiveness and efficiency (i.e., activity ratio and profitability), enhanced 
firm performance as well. More dividend payouts satisfied the interests of various 
stakeholders of hotels. Furthermore, the unique features of the hotel sector, such as 24/7, 
seasonality, perishability, cyclicality, service orientation, differ itself from most other 
industry sectors. The knowledge gained from the hotel business is difficult to transfer to 
other businesses. Higher business diversification implies lower relatedness among 
different properties within a firm. Thus, hotels were suggested not to diversify into other 
business segments as such may ruin firm performance.
Similar to the results found in the restaurant sector, whether hotel business had 
foreign presence or not did not significantly affect firm performance. About 30% of hotel 
observations (firm/year) had significant foreign sales, but these moves did not have 
significant impacts on firm performance. The motive for hotels to have foreign presence 
was questionable from the viewpoint of financial performance.
Sharpe Ratio
Sales growth appeared to be the only significant factor on hotel firm performance as 
measured by the Sharpe ratio from 2000-2004 when only firm effects were considered. 
The better hotel firm performance was associated with a higher growth rate. In other 
words, higher growth signaled a better firm performance perceived by the market in an 
unstable economic condition. Rapid sales growth was a value added strategy which
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resulted in improved hotel firm performance. The result was in line with the findings by 
Keats and Hitt (1988) and Child (1972). On the other hand, dividend and business 
diversification affected hotel firm performance in a significant way under the assumption 
of only time effects. Hotels with fewer business diversifications and more dividend 
payout tended to have better firm performance over themselves. Thus, hotel firm’s sales 
growth, dividend policy and business diversification were perceived to be important by 
the market. The benefits (returns) associated with higher growth, more dividend payout 
and fewer business diversifications were greater than the costs (risks) embedded with 
these practice, thereby improving total risk-adjusted hotel firm performance. On the other 
hand, this study found that liquidity, solvency, activity, profitability, geographical 
presence did not demonstrate significant impacts on hotel total risk-adjusted firm 
performance. The potential reason could be that these effects may have been accounted 
for by either firm differences or time differences measured by the Sharpe ratio in the 
hotel sector.
Strategic Suggestions for the Hotel Sector 
Hotel firms can take certain actions to adjust their financial policies to improve their 
performance. The empirically negative relationship between solvency and firm 
performance suggests that hotel firms’ current debt leverage has exceeded the optimal 
level and reducing debt use can improve firm performance. Though debt usage could 
bring a number of benefits such as less cost of capital and tax shields, the financial costs 
and risks associated with higher debt ratio exceeded the benefits, leading to poorer firm 
performance. Similar to the suggestions given to the restaurant businesses, hotels are also 
recommended to go back to the optimal capital structure by a reduction of debt
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percentages. Although the interest rates were at the historical lower levels during these 5 
years, the influx of more debt bearings for hotels did harm to their performance. Hotel 
firms could improve their performance by retiring or converting debt to stocks. A prudent 
financing mix leaning toward relatively low debt is advisable. Similar to the suggestions 
given in the restaurant sector, hotels are advised to remain conservative; that is, using less 
debt in an unstable economic environment.
Hotel should make the companies more liquid by changing the mix of current 
accounts to enhance firm performance as more liquidity improved firm performance. The 
liquidity shortage costs were tested to overwhelm the liquidity holding costs. Thus, hotel 
firms are suggested to approach the optimal liquidity structure by adding more liquid 
assets. The possible reason was again that more flexibility in liquid assets can greatly 
mitigate the financial stress costs in an uncertain circumstance.
Sales growth was found to be a significantly positive factor to hotels as well. Not only 
can sales growth increases its market share, and synergy, but also increase a firm’s 
publicity and hold out the economic swings. The series of merges and acquisitions which 
increase both assets and revenues in the hotel sector in recent years appeared to be 
successful. Meanwhile, the significant and negative sign of business diversion suggested 
hotels’ keeping focused on the core accommodation business rather than expand to other 
business sectors in order to reduce potential market risks. Diversification into other 
business segments had adverse consequences for hotels, due to increasing costs in 
diversified resources. Furthermore, distribution of dividend in the hotel sector was 
perceived to be good. Since the hotel is a highly cyclical business, the return on 
investment of hotels would be less than the market average during the economic
106
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
downturn. Thus, it was wise to distribute the dividend to its shareholders during 2000- 
2004 for hotel companies.
Profitability and activity ratio gauge the effectiveness and efficiency of the decision 
making process and assets utilization of a hotel firm. They are two internal financial 
benchmarks to guide hotel’s operation and measure how good the management team is. 
Increasing profits and enhancing effectiveness and efficiency are involved with more 
than just financial strategies. Great marketing ideas, new products development, 
consistent quality service, right price approaches, and implementation of good projects 
can enhance hotels profitability and activity ratio, thereby improving firm performance. 
Improving and maintaining profitability and activity ratios high can draw hotel firms 
towards value maximization, which is the best interest of the shareholders. Management 
at all levels should drive its capability to pursue for these objectives.
Recommendations for Future Research 
The relationship between firm-wise financial factors and firm performance was 
empirically evaluated in the hospitality industry from 2000 through 2004. This study 
provides a foundation on which future studies can be developed.
First, the success of the hospitality industry rests on its ability to service the needs of 
both customers, as measured by the satisfaction and loyalty, and shareholders, by firm 
financial performance. The models advanced in this study may help hospitality managers 
satisfy the needs o f shareholders to improve firm performance vis-à-vis firm-specific 
financial factors. Aside from financial performance measures, some subjective or 
judgmental performance ones, which are customer-based and employee-based, such as
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customer and employee satisfaction or loyalty, may be used in the future along with the 
objective financial performance measures.
Second, some theoretical constructs, such as managerial ownership and institutional 
ownership, which were reviewed in Chapter 2, were not empirically examined in the 
study, owing to the lack of data sources. Inclusion of both managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership variables in the model may provide more comprehensive outlooks 
for the hospitality industry.
Third, this study examined the impacts of unit effects and time effects in panel data 
separately because of the software’s constraints. A more realistic picture could have been 
painted if both unit and time effects were simultaneously tested in one equation with 
much more smooth interpretations.
Fourth, it may be noted that no significant results were found when the Treynor ratio 
was used as the measure of systematic risk-adjusted firm performance in both the 
restaurant and hotel sector. This may deserve further investigations for a future study.
Finally, as with much research of this similar nature, the findings in different time 
periods might be different (Keats & Hitt, 1988). Thus, future studies may examine the 
model in the context of another time frame to confirm the findings and conclusions of 
this study. Comparisons of similar models in different time spans might reveal important 
implications for hospitality managers.
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